Preparing military officers for effective service in an inter-agency environment by Nancarrow, Clifford A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-09
Preparing military officers for effective service in an
inter-agency environment
Nancarrow, Clifford A.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS FOR 










 Thesis Advisor:   Terry C. Pierce 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 
0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Preparing Military Officers for Effective Service in an 
Inter-agency Environment  
6. AUTHOR(S) Clifford A. Nancarrow 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis evaluates, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, training and assignment policy 
alternatives for expediting the development and deployment of military officers to fill billets requiring inter-
agency expertise. Using United States Northern Command as a case study, it examines these policy alternatives 
and proposes Joint Mission Essential Tasks that might form the basis for required training and education. It 
proposes the establishment of a Homeland Defense College and suggests that military officers be awarded credit 
for joint tours through service with non-DOD agencies. The thesis argues that uniformed service resistance to 
expanded DOD/inter-agency engagement should be anticipated. Mitigating measures are suggested based 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
116 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Goldwater-Nichols Act, Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, 
USNORTHCOM, Joint Mission Essential Task List, Universal Joint Task List, DOD/Inter-agency 
Collaboration, Department of Defense 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS  
FOR EFFECTIVE SERVICE IN AN INTER-AGENCY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Clifford A. Nancarrow 
Civilian, GS-14, USNORTHCOM 
B.A., Stanford University, 1973 
M.B.A., Cornell University, 1981 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  











Author:  Clifford A. Nancarrow 
 
 








Douglas Porch, PhD 





























This thesis evaluates, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
training and assignment policy alternatives for expediting the development and 
deployment of military officers to fill billets requiring inter-agency expertise. Using 
United States Northern Command as a case study, it examines these policy alternatives 
and proposes Joint Mission Essential Tasks that might form the basis for required training 
and education. It proposes the establishment of a Homeland Defense College and 
suggests that military officers be awarded credit for joint tours through service with non-
DOD agencies. The thesis argues that uniformed service resistance to expanded 
DOD/inter-agency engagement should be anticipated. Mitigating measures are suggested 
based extensively upon a conceptual framework for successful military innovation 







































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................1 
B. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................5 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ................................................................5 
E. METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES .......................................................6 
II. ISSUES IN DEPTH .....................................................................................................9 
III. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION ...........................................................................23 
IV. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: A FURTHER ASSESSMENT..................................31 
V. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS .................................................................37 
VI. EVALUATING JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS .....................................51 
VII. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION..........................................63 
VIII. ASSIGNMENT CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................................73 
IX. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................81 
APPENDIX.............................................................................................................................87 
A.  SURVEY METHODOLOGY.......................................................................87 
B.  SURVEY RESULTS......................................................................................88 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................91 







































ADM      Admiral 
AOR Area of Responsibility 
BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
CBIRF Chemical, Biological Incident Response 
Force 
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
and high Explosive 
CCIR  Commander’s Critical Information 
Requirements 
CIA      Central Intelligence Agency 
CIE      Collaborative Information Environment 
CJCS      Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CM      Consequence Management 
CNO      Chief of Naval Operations 
CONOPS     Concept of Operations 
DHS      Department of Homeland Security 
 
DIMEFIL Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, 
Economics, Finance, Information, Law 
Enforcement 
DNC      Democratic National Convention 
DOD      Department of Defense 
DOS      Department of State 
DSCA      Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
EOC      Emergency Operations Center 
ESF      Emergency Support Function 
FAA      Federal Aviation Administration 
FBI      Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA      Federal Emergency Management Agency 
G-8      Group of Eight Nations 
GAO      General Accounting Office 
HLD      Homeland Defense 
HLS      Homeland Security 
HSOC      Homeland Security Operations Center 
IA      Inter-Agency 
ICE      Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
JCSC      Joint Communications Support Center 
JDAL      Joint Distribution Assignment List 
JFC      Joint Force Commander 
JIACG      Joint Inter-agency Coordination Group 
JMET      Joint Mission Essential Task 
JMETL     Joint Mission Essential Task List 
JOC      Joint Operations Center 
 x
JPME      Joint Professional Military Education 
JSO      Joint Specialty Officer 
JTF      Joint Task Force 
JTTP      Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
LFA      Lead Federal Agency 
LNO      Liaison Officer 
MACC     Multi-Agency Coordination Center 
MOE      Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP      Measures of Performance  
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NC United States Northern Command 
NCTC National Counter-Terrorism Center 
NDU National Defense University 
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
NGO Non-government Organization 
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense 
Command 
NSSE National Special Security Event 
NYPD New York Police Department 
ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness 
OJT On the Job Training 
OPR Office of Primary Responsibility 
PME Professional Military Education 
PVO Private Volunteer Organization 
RCC Regional Combatant Commander 
RDD Radiological Dispersal Device 
RFF Request for Forces 
RNC Republican National Convention 
SECDEF     Secretary of Defense 
SJFHQ-N     Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North 
SJFHQ-NCR Standing Joint Force Headquarters – 
National Capital Region 
TCL      Target Capabilities List 
TSA      Transportation Security Administration 
UJT      Universal Joint Task 
UJTL      Universal Joint Task List 
US      United States 
USA      United States Army 
USAF      United States Air Force 
USG      United States Government 
USCG      United States Coast Guard 
USEUCOM     United States European Command 
USJFCOM     United States Joint Forces Command 
USN      United States Navy 
 xi
USNORTHCOM    United States Northern Command 
USPACOM     United States Pacific Command 
USSS      United States Secret Service 
UT      Universal Task 





























Richard George Nancarrow 
July 17, 1925 – July 9, 2005 
Seaman First Class, USN-I 
United States Navy SEABEES 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM     
Military personnel assigned to Homeland Defense (HLD) positions lack the 
training and experience to serve collaboratively and effectively in unfamiliar roles 
alongside their inter-agency counter-parts. This is a critical deficiency in our HLD effort 
to counter terrorism. Moreover, defeating the asymmetric threats that characterize the 
current strategic environment is a mission that is likely to extend for a generation or 
more.1 Because time is of the essence, the problem of staffing HLD and Homeland 
Security (HLS) billets with properly trained men and women must be immediately 
addressed.   
Certain puzzles quickly emerge in confronting this basic problem. For example, 
what distinctive core tasks must Department of Defense (DOD) personnel operating in an 
inter-agency environment actually perform? How might these tasks be formally identified 
in the manner of a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)? Ancillary problems 
emerge as well. For instance: agencies other than DOD lack military staff representation. 
Without the opportunity to mix routinely in the workplace, DOD and inter-agency 
personnel assigned critical HLD/HLS roles are likely to remain professional strangers to 
one another. Additionally, viable career paths for DOD personnel assigned to HLD/HLS 
billets have yet to be charted. As a result, front running military officers are likely to 
avoid postings outside of established career patterns, such as HLD assignments, even if 
this work is of vital importance.  
In addressing these questions, significant opportunities exist to restructure the 
manner in which DOD personnel and their inter-agency partners operate with one 
another. One method might be to revise the training curricula and student population of 
professional military schools. Another might be to designate officers who serve 
successfully in junior level inter-agency assignments as “inter-agency sub-specialists.” 
These officers would become eligible for follow-on inter-agency assignments at the 
                                                 
1 David Pryce Jones, “The New Cold War: Familiar Battle Lines, Unfortunately,” National Review, 5 
November 2001.  
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leadership level.  A particularly attractive solution might be to accredit assignments in 
inter-agency billets as fulfilling an officer’s joint tour obligation.  
This thesis will evaluate, through the lens of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
policy alternatives for expediting the development and deployment of military officers in 
sufficient quantity to fill billets requiring inter-agency expertise. Using United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) as a case study, it will examine these policy 
alternatives and propose Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) by employing a 
conceptual framework developed by Terry C. Pierce.  His work on the distinction 
between “disruptive” and “sustaining” forms of military innovation is particularly 
applicable to the development of responses to radically altered strategic environments.2 
Emerging asymmetric threats constitute the core of the current strategic environment 
faced by the United States. Effectively countering these threats calls for unprecedented 
levels of DOD and inter-agency cooperation. 
 
B. DISCUSSION 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, it 
was frequently observed that “everything had changed, and the world would never be the 
same.”3 This would appear to be essentially true. Attacks of a similar nature by trans-
national terrorists have subsequently occurred in many nations. The United States 
military has confronted terrorists and their sponsors abroad by force of arms. With 
respect to homeland defense, however, it is less clear that the unique tasks that must be 
collaboratively performed by military and inter-agency personnel have been fully 
identified. Also, the associated changes in personnel training and assignment needed to 
perform these tasks have yet to be defined and implemented.  
Prior to 9/11, DOD’s mission emphasis was focused almost exclusively abroad. 
Nation state foes were to be engaged and defeated on or above distant battlefields or in a 
blue water ocean environment. The missions of HLD, HLS, and defense support of civil 
                                                 
2 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies, Disguising Innovation, (New York: Frank 
Cass, 2004), 1. 
3 Jeff Johnson, “Congressmen: Abolish the INS,” CNSNews.com, Friday, Dec. 21, 2001 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/12/21/63741.shtml,[Accessed 7 August 2005]. 
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authorities (DSCA)4 were generally assigned as no more than collateral duties for local 
military commanders.  This was due in large measure to the Posse Comitatus Act of 
1878, which limits the employment of federal troops in law enforcement roles. 
Additionally “regular” active duty forces could focus their full attention on preparing to 
defeat down range enemies as the National Guard was on point for responding to local 
emergencies. Culturally, the status and promotion opportunities accorded “real” war-
fighters, as differentiated from those personnel assigned to hurricane clean-up duties, 
meant that serious and sustained interaction with non-DOD agencies was almost 
unthinkable.  
Post- 9/11, HLD/HLS and DSCA have emerged from the collateral duty shadows 
and now stand front and center. USNORTHCOM has been established as the DOD focal 
point for undertaking these important but previously under valued missions. Successful 
mission accomplishment will necessitate the swift and coordinated application of 
traditional DOD capabilities in conjunction with the specialized expertise of other 
departments and agencies. USNORTHCOM has established a strong Inter-Agency (IA) 
Directorate to give the Commander ready access to the resources of non-DOD agencies. 
Arguably, however, drawing new branches on the command’s organizational chart and 
adding names to the slots created will not guarantee success.   
Based on the author’s three years of service as a Navy Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer, observation of USNORTHCOM’s involvement in exercise play and real 
world operations, and on a review of certain lessons learned/after action reports, this 
thesis suggests that it will not be enough to simply assign DOD personnel to desks 
alongside of their inter-agency partners expecting them to a) figure out what needs to be 
done and b) how to do it. To ensure mission accomplishment, changes will need to be 
made in the current level of task identification, training, and education of those 
responsible for HLD and HLS missions at USNORTHCOM and throughout DOD and the 
inter-agency community. Cross pollination in the assignment of DOD personnel to 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, (Washington, D.C., 
2005), 5. 
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agencies outside of DOD, and vice versa, as has occurred at NASA for example,5 would 
appear to increase visibility and familiarity where little existed previously. It would also 
facilitate the establishment of important relational networks among personnel at 
operational and leadership levels.  
Changes of this magnitude that literally reweaves the organizational fabric of 
DOD and non-DOD agencies, requires innovation across a broad policy front that rises to 
the level of “disruptive.”6 New composite DOD and inter-agency forces need to be 
created altogether. These forces might be characterized as tartan rather than purple, which 
is the designated color of inter-service jointness. In a tartan organization, the individual 
colors of the component service threads remain perfectly distinguishable and new threads 
of inter-agency organizations are woven into the pattern. Tartan is emblematic of cultural 
integration, not cultural amalgamation, and is indicative of a proud warrior tradition. 
Tartan organizations are conceptually “disruptive” in that they incorporate “novel 
linkages among components”7 that can result in “improved performance along a 
warfighting trajectory that … has not been valued.”8 HLD/HLS and DSCA missions 
comprise a warfighting trajectory that has not historically been valued by DOD. Since 
9/11, however, these missions have become a prominent feature of the strategic 
landscape. DOD can no longer afford to overlook or ignore the value that can be added 
by inter-agency components in fulfilling these missions. 
Pierce cites the examples of armored warfare and carrier warfare where, as forms 
of military innovation, the British essentially “missed twice.”9 As a newly organized 
command, USNORTHCOM has been presented with a unique opportunity to undertake a 
“disruptive” approach to planning and executing its assigned missions. As Pierce points 
out, however, “disruptive” and “sustaining” innovation must be managed differently.10 
                                                 
5 Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era, (Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical 
Information Branch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1982), ch. 8. 
http.//history.nasa.gov/SP-4102/ch8.htm, [Accessed 7 August, 2005]. 
6 Pierce, 1. 
7 Pierce, 25. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Pierce, 32-38; 3. 
10 Pierce, 19. 
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By virtue of their own experience and by the press of competing operational and 
administrative demands, military commanders are susceptible to employing proven 
management techniques in directing all of their command’s endeavors. The result is that 
“sustaining” innovations are consciously or unconsciously nurtured and “disruptive” 
innovations – the type that have been demonstrated to win wars - are similarly suppressed 
or ignored. Were this to occur at USNORTHCOM, a singular opportunity for creating the 
type of organization where disruptive innovation is embraced would have been forever 
missed to the possible detriment of the nation’s defense.    
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
• What are the core tasks required to successfully accomplish DOD/Inter-
agency HLD and HLS missions? 
• Could the Goldwater-Nichols Act serve as a basis for developing and 
implementing policy responses to derivative questions related to:  
• What education and training is required for credentialing military officers to 
serve effectively in an inter-agency environment and how should it be 
delivered?  
• What will motivate front-running officers to compete for opportunities to 
serve in inter-agency billets? How can their career advancement be assured? 
• How will predictable service resistance to expanded inter-agency 
engagement be overcome? 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The United States military has embarked upon a once in a generation strategic 
repositioning of forces and a redefinition of roles and missions intended to confront 
evolving strategic as well as trans-national asymmetric terrorist threats.11 The Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) has directed transformation as a governing principle for all DOD 
                                                 
11 George W. Bush, “Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention,” Dr. Albert B. Sabin 
Cincinnati Cinergy Center, Cincinnati, OH, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary, The White 
House, 16 August 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-4.html, [Accessed 
7 August 2005]. 
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operations in his Transformation Planning Guidance, 2003.12 These initiatives call for a 
realignment of major troop formations and for the deployment of technologically advanced 
combat and support systems. Transformation will also require a reexamination of the skills 
and experience military personnel will need for effective performance of duty within their 
particular service and in joint and inter-agency assignments. Identifying the tasks that will 
need to be performed is critical to the success of these transformational initiatives. As 
recently described by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, 
it is clear that warriors with expanded skills will be needed for the kind of conflict in which 
the United States is currently engaged.13 
The task of closing seams between DOD and inter-agency partners that could be 
exploited by potential adversaries will require unprecedented synchronization of intellect 
and effort on the part of military and civilian leadership. This, in turn, will require a 
coherent and intentional approach to task identification, training, and qualification similar 
to that currently required for joint service assignments. Understanding these requirements 
and devising the necessary policies to implement corrective action is paramount. From the 
perspective of the overall homeland defense effort, no other actions may be of greater 
importance.    
E. METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES 
This thesis will evaluate tasks that might comprise a draft JMETL for DOD/inter-
agency billets through the use of a survey administered to USNORTHCOM personnel 
who have deployed to various National Special Security Events alongside inter-agency 
counterparts. It will also draw on preliminary analyses of proposed JMETs performed at 
USNORTHCOM and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). 
In the manner of a case study, this thesis will also briefly compare the historical 
context in which the Goldwater-Nichols Act was originally drafted and enacted with the 
current DOD/inter-agency operational and transformational environment. Assessments of 
the Act’s effectiveness will be examined. Various service policies and directives 
                                                 
12  U.S. Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance, (Washington, D.C., 2003), 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29618, [Accessed 7 August 2005]. 
13 Jim Garamone, Defend America, US Department of Defense News About the War on Terrorism. 
American Forces Press Service (Washington, DC, 28 October, 2004), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/n10282004_2004102806.html. 
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implementing the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will be reviewed to determine 
if there is a suitable template that can be readily modified and adapted to the DOD/inter-
agency situation. In addition to the survey mentioned previously, specific resources to be 
employed include published analyses, DOD instructions, articles and studies describing 
current transformational initiatives, and unpublished USNORTHCOM National Special 
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II. ISSUES IN DEPTH 
Arguably, “business as usual” for the US military should have ended with the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.14 Absent a 
well defined and clearly articulated threat on the scale of the Soviet Union, the decade 
from 1991 to 2001 was characterized by calls for peace dividends and searches for 
revised defense strategies, reexaminations of traditional weapons systems, and 
consolidation of military bases at home and abroad. Little transformational change among 
the services actually occurred. DOD response to the one significant effort at reform, 
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, was largely one of reluctant 
acknowledgement rather than active embrace. The act’s provisions could be said to have 
been met with a uniquely military reaction - a dismissive “noted” as contrasted with an 
enthusiastic “aye aye.”15  
President George H.W. Bush introduced a comprehensive new National Security 
Strategy for defense transformation in 1990.16 This was followed by various plans and 
agendas advanced by the component services that, subsequent to their roll-out, generally 
languished in the twilight realm of perpetual staffing. DOD continued as a world unto 
itself. Only the most minimal consideration was given to DOD’s potential roles requiring 
comprehensive and sustained engagement with other agencies of the federal government.  
The Coast Guard and the National Guard were barely on the screen as elements of 
national power. Professional development paths for military personnel were stable, 
assignments predictable, and the distinction between “career enhancing” and “career 
limiting” broadly if informally understood. To the extent innovation was occurring within  
                                                 
14 William Y. Frentzel, John M. Bryson and Barbara C. Crosby, “Strategic Planning in the Military, 
The US Naval Security Group Changes Its Strategy, 1992-1998,” Long Range Planning, 2000, 3, 405. 
15 Ibid., 410. 
16 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium” (as delivered), 
Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO) The White House. August 2, 1990. Quoted in James J. Tritten 
and Paul N. Stockton, Reconstituting America’s Defense, The New U.S. National Security Strategy, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 11. 
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DOD at all, it was the type described by Pierce as “sustaining innovation” – that is 
incremental transformation possibly “result[ing] in … improved performance along a 
trajectory that has traditionally been valued.”17    
This stable environment was shattered on the morning of 9/11/2001 by the 
terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and on the 
Pentagon in Washington, DC. Without diminishing the magnitude of the loss of life and 
the scope of the horror visited upon surviving families and loved ones, the shudder felt 
throughout the Pentagon was symbolic as well as tangible. The impetus for radical 
change in DOD’s relationship with its inter-agency partners had arrived at 0937 that 
morning in the form of a commercial jet liner smashing into the southwest E-ring. DOD 
suddenly found itself confronted by the necessity of charting a path characterized by 
Pierce as “disruptive innovation… requir[ing] new skills and routines.”18 Pointing to an 
example provided by another authority on the innovation process, Barry Posen, Pierce 
observes “When threats to security are high, however, so are the incentives to achieve a 
disruptive innovation”19 and notes that at this point “civilian leaders may directly 
intervene to impose and audit disruptive innovation.”20   
On the morning of 9/11/2001, the threats to the nation’s security increased 
dramatically and direct civilian intervention in spurring DOD transformation became an 
imperative. To successfully counter asymmetric terrorist threats and to effectively 
mitigate the consequences of any follow-on attacks, it was suddenly clear that DOD 
would need to undertake swiftly the steps necessary to plan and conduct a broad scope of 
operations with its inter-agency partners on a near continuous basis.  
To execute these unanticipated missions DOD will need to provide a steady flow 
of military officers to serve in DOD and inter-agency billets (jobs) at both the junior and 
senior officer level. These officers should be equipped to succeed in the performance of 
duties that, in many respects, differ from those encountered in a service specific or joint 
environment. While junior officers might reasonably be expected to require and 
                                                 
17 Pierce, 25. 
18 Ibid., 25. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Ibid. 
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accomplish a certain amount of on the job training when first posted to billets requiring 
inter-agency involvement, senior officers (O-5 and above) will need to be ready to 
assume positions of leadership on arrival at the newly established USNORTHCOM and 
at other joint commands with HLD and HLS responsibilities. These leadership positions 
will demand the immediate application of skills mastered in previous assignments as well 
as those unique to the inter-agency arena. At a minimum, these officers will need to have 
a working knowledge of the legal authorities and constraints that impact DOD operations 
in support of civil authorities, they must have a detailed grasp of the roles and missions 
assigned to their inter-agency counterparts, they should have operational experience in 
serving alongside of these agencies and organizations, and they should have a 
demonstrated grasp of the cultural differences likely to impinge on the planning and 
conduct of HLD and HLS operations. Obtaining these skills will require focused training. 
For the requisite training to occur, a distinct set of HLD/HLS Joint Mission 
Essential Tasks (JMETs) needs to be formally identified, collated, and forwarded to the 
Joint Staff for review and approval. When completed, the JMET List (JMETL) will 
constitute the criteria for introducing or revising curriculum elements included in the 
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system and may be recommended for 
inclusion in service specific entry-level training programs. Concurrently, billet 
descriptions for existing and planned billets must be revised to incorporate these newly 
delineated skills. Each of the services will need to create and fund their proportionate 
share of these billets.  Further, they will need to modify their professional skills tracking 
systems to enable the identification of men and women whose training and experience 
satisfy the JMET requirements. Finally, career paths and duty rotations will need to be 
mapped out in a manner that ensures officers who perform successfully in these billets 
stand with or ahead of their peers when competing for advancement.  
Synchronizing all of these disparate elements is a task of enormous complexity 
made even more difficult by the current absence of a centralized DOD champion 
 12
ordesignated Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).21. Each of the services has been 
left to “fit” these modifications into its established training and personnel systems. These 
systems are frequently perceived to be entrenched bureaucracies characterized by opaque 
and rigid procedures. They are commonly held to adopt and implement change at no 
better than a glacial pace. The policies guiding these bureaucracies prescribe career paths 
developed to fit Cold War requirements and the earliest ventures into the “new” era of 
joint service. Of even greater concern is that the agencies now comprising the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are clearly focusing all of their energy on 
completing the largest reorganization of the federal government in its history. It is 
difficult to imagine that the concept of incorporating DOD personnel into the heart of 
these agencies’ operations is receiving front-burner attention.  
As for state and local law enforcement and emergency response organizations, 
their priorities are largely focused on writing grants to obtain their sought after shares of 
windfall federal funding for the acquisition of capital equipment and for the design and 
execution of HLD/HLS exercises.22 Who can blame them? Lost in this scramble is an 
intentional effort on the part of DOD or DHS to specify and convey to these grant writers 
the types of assistance and the types of professional skills that military personnel might 
contribute to the resolution of a crisis. In a developing emergency, when first responders 
at the state and local level have exhausted the response resources available to them, DOD 
is the provider of last resort. DOD also offers unique capabilities that may be required, 
often on short notice, at the scene of a crisis. It will be imperative for DOD to have 
planned for these contingencies and to have coordinated these plans with the first 
responder community.  
Similarly, if a collaborative effort is required to deter, prevent, or defeat a terrorist 
threat, it may well be a member of local law enforcement or an analyst in a state 
emergency operations or threat evaluation center who provides the last element of 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, 2004 DOD Training Transformation Implementation Plan—Appendix 
1T, AP1-123, (Washington, D.C., 2004). (The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense – Personnel has 
only recently been tasked to tackle the training aspect, with preliminary deliverables scheduled for the Fall 
of 2005. Final outputs are due in the Fall of 2007). 
22 U.S. Government Accounting Office, “Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, 
House of Representatives, HOMELAND SECURITY, Management of First Responder Grant Programs 
Has Improved, But Challenges Remain,” GAO-05-121, (Washington, D.C., 2005), 4. 
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information necessary for DOD forces to act. DOD might also enlist the specialized 
assistance of other federal departments and agencies in disrupting or averting the event 
entirely – possibly abroad or at great distance from the locale generating the intelligence. 
In these circumstances, time is a critical variable. Speed of response is at the heart of the 
9/11 Commission’s call for a unity of effort and the creation of a culture based not on a 
“need to know” but rather on a “need to share.”23 When a crisis is developing, DOD is 
likely to be the pivot agency for a coordinated response. Planning now is essential.   Also, 
civilian intervention in the form of legislative initiatives almost certainly will be required 
to overcome the spirit of resistance to expeditious change that can be anticipated from the 
various service components.  
The US has sophisticated technology, armies of law enforcement personnel, and a 
motivated professional military available to deter and defeat the terrorist threat. Never the 
less, these capabilities have, to date, been inadequately marshaled and coordinated. These 
capabilities remain incompletely focused despite much activity and the expenditure of 
significant effort and treasure. DOD has had experience over the years assisting civilian 
agencies, particularly the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the 
National Forest Service, in providing relief from natural disasters and in fighting wild 
land fires. These relationships, however, do not extend to the federal agencies whose 
principal missions relate to law enforcement. These agencies tend to be wary of their 
counterparts in camouflage. 
Unfortunately, the HLD mission, that is close-in defense of the approaches to the 
North American continent and Caribbean Islands, is unlike any civil support assignment. 
Al Qaeda is neither a hurricane nor an invasion of bark beetles. Successfully countering 
the terrorist threat to the US homeland will require a transformation in organizational 
alignment among DOD and its partner agencies. This would be consistent with the larger 
DOD transformation objectives set forth by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,24 but will 
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involve an enormous amount of intellectual heavy lifting, sophisticated relationship 
building, and sheer perseverance in overcoming entrenched bureaucratic inertia.  
The task of synchronizing and leveraging the disparate elements and unique 
attributes of each agency involved in sustaining an anti-terror fight of perhaps 
generations’ duration is enormously complex. In the case of HLD and HLS, the existing 
components are not the familiar armor and air power linked by the German armed forces 
in the manner of Blitzkrieg,25 but are instead, active duty forces, National Guard troops 
and law enforcement personnel at the local, state and federal levels. Though attributable 
to many factors, in the twelve years since the first World Trade Center terrorist attack 
killed and injured significant numbers of Americans on US soil, these vital linkages have 
not been fully established.26  
Statutory barriers, most notably the Posse Comitatus Act, restrict the employment 
of active duty military forces in performing many anti-terror missions.27 Of perhaps 
greater significance, however, are inter-service and inter-agency cultural barriers that, 
arguably, will only be overcome through deliberate action at the leadership level. If the 
full spectrum of national power is to be brought to bear in confronting the terrorist threat, 
these barriers will need to be demolished or circumvented. This array of power includes 
the components of Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, Economics, Finance, Information, 
and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) power. Only the “M,” lies entirely within the 
historical operational realm of DOD. The other elements are the purview of agencies with 
whom DOD must learn to partner.  
DOD, however, is likely to look askance at any initiative advanced as a 
revolutionary “answer” to the task of planning and executing sophisticated and unfamiliar 
operations against an adaptive foe. Possibly involving unprecedented combinations of 
active duty military forces, inter-agency partners, and state and local first responders, this 
new way of waging war is likely to be met with skepticism and passive or active 
resistance. As reported by Pierce, Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Elmo Zumwalt 
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largely failed in his “Project 60” transformational initiative by employing a top down 
implementation strategy in which the Navy’s leaders were asked, implored, and directed 
to accept the elements of the CNO’s plan to confront the emerging Soviet blue water 
threat on the basis of the plan’s revolutionary attributes.28  
Within most organizations and particularly DOD, “new” and “better” are concepts 
not generally received with much enthusiasm. The harbingers of change are frequently 
checked into the boards by their peers - or worse - as an example to others with the 
temerity to challenge the established order or strategic view. This would seem to be true 
even if there appears to be wide spread recognition in both lay and professional circles 
that a sea-change has occurred in the strategic environment. For example, following the 
successful terrorist attacks on the twin towers of New York City’s World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon on 9/11/2001, a common theme was “everything has changed.”29 It 
would seem, then, that new ways of organizing to confront an adversary prepared to 
engage in asymmetric warfare on a global scale would not only be accepted but actively 
sought, explored, and evaluated by those charged with responsibility for the nation’s 
defense.  In the case of DOD, however, the adaptation and change assimilation process 
has, instead, been slow.  
USNORTHCOM formed in 2002, represents a civilian directed response to the 
perceived shortcomings of the geographically and functionally distributed military 
command arrangement in place on 9/11. At that time, responsibility for the ground 
defense of the United States was assigned to the First and Fifth US Armies. Air defense 
responsibilities were assigned to the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD, the combined US and Canadian command that remains collocated with but 
separate from USNORTHCOM). Maritime defense responsibility was assigned to the US 
Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. USNORTHCOM, unlike any predecessor 
organization, is solely responsible for all DOD operations associated with the HLD and 
HLS missions within its AOR. It is further distinguished from its Regional Combatant 
Command counter-parts by a numerically robust inter-agency directorate aligned with the 
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traditional directorates of Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, etc. Additionally, 
USNORTHCOM features a Standing Joint Force Headquarters element as prescribed in 
the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance that is capable of deploying on short notice to form 
the command and control nucleus for a Joint Task Force.30  
Apart from its subordinate commands, Joint Task Force – Civil Support, JTF-
North, JTF-Alaska, and Standing Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region, 
USNORTHCOM is assigned no traditionally constituted standing forces per se. That is, 
the Commander, USNORTHCOM, does not maintain daily operational control over 
significant numbers of fighter planes, destroyers, or armored cavalry units. As emerging 
situations dictate, the USNORTHCOM commander draws forces of appropriate 
composition and quantity on a request basis from US Joint Forces Command via a 
SECDEF approved Request for Forces (RFF).  
In lieu of these assigned forces, USNORTHCOM’s main battery is intended to be 
an operationally focused Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) comprised of 
people and technology. When fully mature, the CIE will provide USNORTHCOM with 
continuous access to and interaction with subject matter experts internal and external to 
the command. These knowledge warriors will offer various headquarters teams and 
working groups expert perspective on potential adversaries and their core systems. 
Extending beyond the scope of intelligence fusion organizations, the USNORTHCOM 
CIE is intended to facilitate the efforts of the staff in the swift conversion of classified 
and open source information into actions across the DIMEFIL spectrum.  
The members of this CIE will be linked by secure collaborative planning tools, as 
well as by more conventional classified and unclassified e-mail systems and telephone. 
The technology employed enhances decision-making speed and the completion of staff 
actions. It includes secure voice over internet as well as the capability to remotely view 
power point presentations and to work efficiently on a global basis in plan development 
mark-up sessions.  
The key benefit of the CIE, however, is not the technology but the people.  The 
members of the CIE will include personnel with specialized expertise. The CIE roster is 
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established on a pre-crisis basis but can be tailored to emerging events. It includes but is 
not limited to representatives from USNORTHCOM subordinate and component 
commands, law enforcement agencies, counter terrorist centers, USCG, Treasury, 
Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies on an as required basis. The 
CIE is rounded out by the participation of representatives from designated academic 
Centers of Excellence sponsored by DOD and DHS. As an example, the University of 
Southern California has received a DHS grant to lead a consortium of colleges and 
universities in establishing the Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic 
Analysis of Terrorist Events.31  
The involvement of CIE subject matter experts from the academic arena, national 
labs, and industry, will add an invaluable non-military dimension to the analytical work 
performed by the USNORTHCOM staff. The CIE provides a point of entry into the inter-
agency environment for the accomplishment of both USNORTHCOM’s HLD and HLS 
missions. The distinction between the two missions is important. For USNORTHCOM 
“Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population and critical 
infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. 
Homeland security is a national team effort that begins with local, state and federal 
organizations. DOD and [US]NORTHCOM's HLS roles include homeland defense and 
civil support.”32  
USNORTHCOM’s inter-agency, operations and plans directorates must, on a 
daily basis, focus on its civil support/HLS mission. In this arena, as examples, 
USNORTHCOM coordinates DOD’s response to natural disasters and augments state 
and local security forces in support of National Special Security Events such as the 
national political conventions. These inescapable tasks demand significant attention and 
consume immense amounts of energy. The staff’s access to the CIE enables vital and 
comprehensive pre-crisis HLD planning to continue concurrently on an uninterrupted 
basis. 
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Proficiency in the employment of this transformational CIE main battery by 
military officers posted to USNORTHCOM and their ability to leverage the full 
capabilities of inter-agency partners on short notice has been assumed in the military 
services’ assignment processes. Most officers arrive at USNORTHCOM directly from a 
field assignment with their sending service or perhaps from a tour on the Joint Staff. 
However, virtually none have had any focused training or direct interaction with non-
military elements of the CIE. Members of the National Guard on active duty would 
clearly represent an exception, but generally, the sending services have not structured 
assignments to provide officers with these types of interactions. They have not, 
historically, been motivated to do so. 
What accounts for DOD’s reluctance to engage with inter-agency partners? James 
Q. Wilson has postulated that “Organizations will accept (or at least not bitterly resist) 
inventions that facilitate the performance of existing tasks in a way consistent with 
existing managerial arrangements [emphasis added]”33 The DOD inter-agency 
organizational construct established at USNORTHCOM is intended to serve as a new 
managerial arrangement to enable the performance of existing tasks more rapidly while 
taking on new tasks associated with emerging threats. Thus, according to Wilson, the 
stage has been set for organizational rejection. In that USNORTHCOM itself is a new 
organization within DOD, certain of these objections may be more readily overcome than 
at the more established Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) where the need for 
dynamic inter-agency engagement is only now beginning to be recognized. Wilson 
observes that “the longer an agency exists the more likely that its core tasks [and 
corresponding organizational forms] will be defined in ways that …. maximize the costs 
of changing them.”34  
USNORTHCOM has demonstrated some recent successes through engagement 
with inter-agency partners in conjunction with operations remote from its headquarters. 
Members of the staff have deployed in support of the 2004 G-8 Summit, the Democratic 
National Convention, the Republican National Convention, and the 2005 Presidential 
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Inauguration. In each of these events, the United States Secret Service has served as the 
Lead Federal Agency (LFA). Support to the LFA was provided by multiple federal 
agencies as well as by state and local law enforcement and emergency planning and 
response organizations. Operations were conducted out of a designated Multi-Agency 
Coordination Center (MACC) – not a military headquarters.  
The NSSE military presence in each instance took an unprecedented form. At the 
two conventions, the senior military officer in command of the DOD Joint Task Force 
(JTF) was a State National Guard General Officer in command of both National Guard 
forces and active duty forces. This “double-hatted” command and control arrangement 
enabled the JTF commander to report to his state governor for the law enforcement role 
his forces might have been called on to play. It also enabled him to report to Commander 
USNORTHCOM in fulfilling DOD’s role of defense support to civil authorities. The 
arrangement was unprecedented. It vested in one commander the authorities of USC Title 
32 which governs the operations of National Guard forces and USC Title 10 which 
governs, and limits, the operations of active duty forces in their civil support role.35  
In Massachusetts and New York, the JTF commander’s deputy, or second in 
command, was an active duty Navy Captain from USNORTHCOM– the deputy director 
of the embedded Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N). USNORTHCOM 
provided additional active duty forces to augment the JTF headquarters team – 
communications specialists, intelligence personnel, operations’ watch standers, medical 
planners, and force protection experts. These personnel were self-sustaining. They did not 
represent a drain on the energies or resources of the LFA. They also came equipped at the 
G-8 and the DNC with a sophisticated communications van that added specialized secure 
voice and secure teleconferencing capability that would have otherwise been unavailable 
to on-scene decision makers. The command and control arrangement and the close 
alliance with inter-agency partners in conducting these operations constituted a new form 
of warfighting capability. The novel linkage of forces represented a coordinated effort to 
deter and defend against a terrorist attack through a display of force and a well prepared 
state guard and active duty units.   The SJFHQ-N detachment that deployed to the NSSEs 
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served as a small unit of the type described by Wilson, created specifically to take on new 
tasks.36 In this role, particularly, “small” is good as DOD is frequently perceived by state 
and local first responders as being “too big” and “too much,” as well as “too take charge” 
and, generally, “too late” to be of much help. As one of “his” staff directorates, SJFHQ-N 
is capable of being deployed directly by the USNORTHCOM commander who would 
otherwise need a SECDEF approved RFF to provide augmentation personnel. The 
implication is that USNORTHCOM can respond quickly and with capability. Speed is 
good. It is at the heart of the broader DOD transformation initiative, “a future force that is 
defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and 
sustain, one that relies more heavily on … information technologies.”37 
Though it is unlikely that events will occur on a repeat basis in any one state, the 
professional relationships forged with the personnel from the Secret Service, FEMA, 
USCG, FBI, and other federal agencies involved with these types of events contributes to 
a valuable sense of operational continuity among the inter-agency partners. The members 
of the USNORTHCOM deployable detachment can begin to anticipate the moves of their 
inter-agency partners and can become more familiar with their operational and 
professional cultures. Providing direct and immediate support to inter-agency partners on 
a regular basis constitutes new core tasks for DOD, a hallmark of genuine innovation.38 
Putting the same team in the field for multiple events enables the methods for 
accomplishing these tasks to be better refined, cultural impediments overcome, and the 
speed of response enhanced. 
Acting in concert with inter-agency partners to fulfill HLD missions, 
USNORTHCOM can devise and suggest to SECDEF, alternative courses of action 
involving the application of diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, 
information, law enforcement (DIMEFIL) elements of national power. The employment 
of national power extends well beyond the application of military force. Employing a 
football analogy, an offensive lineman does not have to “pancake” block his opponent on 
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every play. He may simply influence the defender away from the hole the running back 
will be cutting through. In confronting the adaptive and elusive terrorists,  DOD must be 
able to not only deliver a crushing kinetic blow (or pancake block equivalent) when 
required, but must also be able to deter attacks through collaborative interaction with 
inter-agency partners.  
This represents a new way of fighting with which DOD commands are neither 
familiar nor enthusiastic. It further represents the particular characteristic of disruptive 
innovation that Pierce describes as “the exploration of new linkages among components 
and the assimilation of new knowledge.”39 Resistance to the concept by both DOD and 
inter-agency organizations is predictable, as has been demonstrated by Wilson. From the 
inter-agency perspective, the suspicion with which a perceived monolithic and gorilla-
sized DOD is viewed is likely to be overcome only incrementally and intentionally. 
Whittling away at these perceptions will require the best efforts of military officers who 
are trained to the task. These officers must bring to the table not only their service 
specific expertise and an understanding of joint planning processes, but also an 
appreciation for, if not experience with, the capabilities of their inter-agency partners.  
“Old knowledge” needs to be “rooted out” and “new knowledge created”.40 Absent 
civilian intervention in this transformation process of the type represented by the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is not clear that the creation of new knowledge will occur. 
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III. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION 
How reluctant is the military to embrace and implement comprehensive 
organizational change, even in the face of incontrovertible evidence that the strategic 
landscape has shifted?  The history of efforts to create a joint staff and to effect a 
consistently joint approach to the planning and conduct of military operations serves as a 
useful case study for addressing this question.  
The successful prosecution of World War II was followed immediately thereafter 
by a dramatic realignment of the international strategic balance on the scale of a major 
tectonic event. While the threat posed by the rise of the Soviet Union was real enough, 
the implications of incorporating nuclear weapons into the war fighting equation was not 
fully understood by either the military or the civilian leadership. The impact of this new 
technology complicated the analysis of the types and numbers of military formations that 
might be required in future conflicts, should they occur.  
Following World War II, relations between the services were strained. Clashes 
over future roles and missions were made more animated by differing perceptions of the 
contribution made by each to winning the war just ended.41  Key issues in the debate 
surrounding the National Security Act of 1947 included the power and status of the 
service secretaries with respect to a single Secretary of Defense, the power and status of 
the Secretary of Defense with respect to the uniformed service chiefs, access to the 
president, size and authority of a joint staff, and, finally and unsurprisingly, control of the 
military’s various budgets.42  
Passage of the 1947 Act left important issues unaddressed. For instance, in 
deference to the continuing clout of the individual services, no provision was made for a 
chairman of the new joint staff. Rather, the service chiefs (excluding the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps) were expected to convene in a collegial manner to formulate common 
plans and policies. The arrangement proved untenable. It is also interesting that under the 
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provisions of this act, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, found himself with 
only the “power to persuade”, not to direct, the activities of those departments he was 
statutorily charged with coordinating.43 In an eerie and unfortunate historical echo, this 
administratively impossible arrangement would manifest itself again in the course of the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security as Director and then Secretary Thomas 
Ridge struggled over the first 18 months of his tenure to marshal the resources of 
multiple departments and agencies in a coordinated anti-terror campaign.     
The National Security Act was amended in 1949, strengthening the authority of 
the Secretary of Defense,44 and again in 1953 and 1958. The sought after breakthroughs 
in fostering a joint approach to defense planning and execution failed to materialize, 
however. Neither did the envisioned budgetary savings.  What is clear, however, as 
evidenced by the continuing frontal and rear guard actions waged by the services against 
these legislative initiatives, is that absent the impetus provided by the civilian leadership, 
the services would not, of themselves, have moved closer to embracing one another let 
alone a shared approach to undertaking common endeavors.  
The civilian catalyst role in bringing about military change is a featured element 
of Barry Posen’s arguments with respect to military innovation.45 As Pierce notes, 
however, reform is not the same as innovation and organizational reformation alone is 
seldom enough to produce the types of disruptive innovation that leads to gaining a 
decisive advantage over a determined adversary.46 But civilian imposed reform is a 
factor, and when confronted by persistent military intransigence, may be the only tool 
available to effect transformation.  
Ultimately, the test of either reform or innovation comes down to a matter of 
performance. Frustrated by service performance in the 1950’s, civilian leadership 
continued to impose legislative reform on the Department of Defense.47 It was 
substandard performance on the battlefield in the early 1980’s that finally opened the 
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door for landmark and perhaps permanent legislative change, enacted over the strenuous 
objections of the services, that may presage the attainment of the type of innovation that 
linking DOD and its inter-agency partners represents.  
As recounted by James R. Locher, III, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
culminated four years of intense close-quarters political combat in which an entrenched 
Pentagon bureaucracy battled the United States Congress over the issue of expanded 
jointness among the disparate military services.48 This battle was preceded by years of 
bureaucratic skirmishing and maneuvering between elected officials and the nation’s 
most senior uniformed officers. Outright political conflict was precipitated by several 
instances of the military’s failure to respond in a fully satisfactory manner to newly 
emerging threats. DOD’s performance was attributed to flawed organizational alignments 
rather than to either will or skill on the part of those who were sent “in harm’s way.” The 
legislative history of Goldwater-Nichols and its impact on military effectiveness merits 
closer scrutiny as the threats the nation faces continue to evolve. Specifically, it would 
appear as if amending Goldwater-Nichols might provide the stimulus needed for DOD to 
actively embrace its expanded involvement with inter-agency partners. It might also 
accelerate the pace of training officers for assignment to billets leading to enhanced 
performance of DOD’s HLD/HLS missions. 
Locher notes that the principal catalysts for the Goldwater-Nichols legislation 
were a) the painful examination of lessons learned following three military actions in 
which preparedness and inter-service cooperation fell well short of the desired and 
expected mark; and b) the willingness on the part of Joint Chiefs Chairman, General 
David C. Jones, USAF, to break with his fellow service chiefs in calling for radical 
organizational change in 1982.49   
These actions commenced with Operation Eagle Claw, mounted in April, 1980 to 
rescue the hostages seized by Iran at the US Embassy six months previously. This 
mission was aborted and the “Desert One” rendezvous point by which the mission is 
colloquially remembered littered with the burnt out remains of six helicopters and a C-
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130. Eight servicemen were killed. The 52 hostages remained in captivity for another 
nine months. Mission failure was attributed to a combination of a non-functional joint 
planning process, an absence of joint doctrine and cross-service experience, and an array 
of incompatible equipment.50  
A core issue as well, was the lack of preparation on the part of DOD to anticipate 
and develop plans to counter an insurgent threat or to collaborate effectively with the 
State Department and CIA in evaluating the specific situation in Iran as it was unfolding. 
A similar lack of situational awareness and preparedness became suddenly and 
dramatically apparent when another Islamic asymmetric terrorist operation was launched 
in the form of a suicide truck bomb against the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, 
on Sunday morning, October 23, 1983. In this attack, 241 servicemen perished.51   
Ironically, as the smoke was curling above the ruined barracks and the ongoing 
rescue and recovery activities, final planning was underway at the Pentagon for the 
execution of Operation Urgent Fury. This was the joint mission to rescue 600 American 
medical students thought to be imperiled and at risk of capture in the midst of a 
developing partisan military conflict on the Caribbean Island of Grenada. The cobbled 
together nature of this operation, the late addition of forces to the basic plan,52 a 
compartmentalized communications plan,53 and the multiple reported instances of inter-
operability failures among command and control arrangements and equipment have 
become the stuff of military legend.54 As in the two previous missions, the cost of an ad 
hoc approach to joint operations was measured in lost lives and hospital beds populated 
by the wounded.  
The memory of these marred missions provided the impetus needed to push the 
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the legislative top. The services had resisted 
organizational realignment and reform for decades. Locher exhaustively catalogues the 
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instances of push back, foot dragging and, had it occurred at a more junior level, 
insubordination, dating to the Truman and Eisenhower years.55  
What were the Act’s principal provisions and what impact have they had in 
subsequent years? A National Defense University summary states, “Operational authority 
was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. 
The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National 
Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-
chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the 
secretary of defense to the unified commanders.”56  
In addition to these fundamental organizational changes that have material 
ramifications for the overall planning and conduct of the nation’s military operations, 
Goldwater-Nichols addressed the matter of officer training and assignment. This is a 
critical lever to ensure implementation of the Act’s other provisions as it translates the 
theoretical and conceptual into the personal. Officers who aspire to promotion and to the 
assumption of increased responsibility within the defense hierarchy - in senior DOD 
positions and in private sector roles as highly compensated executives following 
retirement, jobs typically open only to those who have served at the flag and general 
officer level – must now get their joint ticket punched. Specifically Title IV, Section 404 
states: “An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or 
rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.”57 This 
provision may be waived on only the most limited basis and, should a waiver be 
authorized, “the Secretary shall provide that the first duty assignment as a general or flag 
officer of an officer for whom the waiver is granted shall be in a joint duty assignment.”58  
Of critical importance is the element of this provision that waivers may only be 
granted by senior members of the office of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically 
excluded from the exercise of this authority are the uniformed service chiefs and service 
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Secretaries who might be inclined to cite the needs of their particular service component 
as a rational reason for circumventing the joint service requirement. In a follow-on article 
to his book, Locher reports, “The services resisted [the creation of] a joint officer 
personnel system since they knew that loss of absolute control of officer promotions and 
assignments would weaken their domination of the Pentagon. Congress was equally 
determined since it had concluded ‘The current system results in incentives to protect 
service interests rather than to think in joint terms. Joint thinkers are likely to be 
punished, and service promoters are likely to be rewarded’.”59  
This service centric perspective appears to be little changed with respect to inter-
service cooperation and coordination in the joint arena. In a 2002 survey, the GAO found 
that, “When we asked officers to provide their opinion regarding the greatest disincentive 
to serving in a joint duty position, officers in all of the services cited the time they spent 
in a joint position that took them away from their service.”60 It is arguable that this 
perspective would almost certainly apply if assignments to inter-agency elements were to 
be folded into the military career path mix.  
Part of the problem is that service men and women must first be expert in their 
own professional arts. This is non-negotiable and, in most respects, laudable. The nation 
is not well served if military professionals are unable to employ their sensor and weapon 
systems in an unconditionally effective and lethal manner when called upon to do so. In 
honing these skills, officers invest countless hours in intensive training and in operational 
environments where counting on their fellow service members and those above and 
below them in the chain of command becomes literally instinctive. This unshakable trust 
and confidence in those sharing the same burden is a good and natural outcome. The flip 
side of service centric camaraderie, however, is the innate suspicion of those whose 
backgrounds and experiences are different. Through the experience of joint service 
alongside men and women from the different branches, some of these prejudices can be 
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overcome and operational trust established. It is plausible that this experience could be 
replicated in an inter-agency environment. 
Of greater concern is the tendency for service specific allegiances to warfighting 
methods and practices to obscure evolving and mounting threats that may appear to fall 
into another service’s “lane.” Collectively, as each service focuses on its own operational 
sphere and its geo-spatial area of responsibility – air, sea, land, space – a common 
operational picture of the enemy or potential enemies fails to emerge. Thus, the Marine 
Barracks in Beirut, the USS COLE and the Khobar Towers dormitories are destroyed by 
Islamic terrorists engaging in a form of asymmetric warfare whose salient feature is the 
suicide attack. Successfully combating a terrorist adversary who has been at war with us 
for the better part of two decades requires alliances that extend beyond the joint world to 
the inter-agency arena. The indicators and warnings of an impending terrorist attack on 
the US Homeland my come from the national intelligence community with which DOD 
is familiar. These warnings might also be developed through law enforcement channels, 
state department sources, or border and customs activities. 
If terrorist elements with global reach constitute the new enemy, then the 
uniformed services need to ensure that their best people are engaged in the fight, serving 
seamlessly alongside their inter-agency counterparts who will be shouldering a critical 
share of the burden. In a strictly military context, the early experience with assignments 
to the joint staff suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. Again, this is attributable to 
the tendency of the various services to protect and promote “their own.” Locher cites 
ADM William Crowe, USN, who served both as a Unified Commander (USPACOM), 
and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Crowe believed that joint work suffered 
from poor officer management: ‘I was likewise convinced that the quality of officers 
detailed [assigned by their services] to the Joint Staff could use substantial upgrading. It 
was unusual to find the most highly regarded officers laboring in the Joint Staff vineyard; 
many considered a tour there as a hurdle on the career path.’”61 Subsequent to the 
implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, this trend was reversed. By December of 2002, 
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the GAO found that “Most officers (70 percent) responded that a joint duty assignment 
was beneficial to their career to a moderate or very great extent.”62 
If the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff has improved (largely through 
the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Title IV provisions), what about the other 
aspects of the Act? How effective have they been in achieving the desired effects of 
increased inter-service cooperation?     
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IV. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: A FURTHER ASSESSMENT 
Goldwater-Nichols was enacted to overcome intractable service resistance to 
adopting a joint approach for the planning and conduct of military operations. Further 
legislative action may be required to motivate the services to embrace inter-agency 
operations in a robust and unqualified manner. The truth of the matter, however, is that 
Goldwater-Nichols remains very much a work in progress nearly nineteen years 
subsequent to being signed into law without fanfare by President Reagan on October 1, 
1986. Following four years of legislative in-fighting, the services had expressed no 
interest in participating in a White House or Pentagon bill signing ceremony.63 The lack 
of enthusiasm with which this legislation was greeted has continued. Despite ongoing 
service resistance, made possible by leaving actual implementation to each of the service 
components, limited progress has been made in developing joint professional competency 
among a growing number of military officers.  
The GAO provided a report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives in 2002. Key findings of this 
report cited in the executive summary included (underscores added): 
Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers through 
education by establishing a two-phased joint education program, but has 
not determined how many officers should complete both phases.  In fiscal 
year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions had 
completed both phases of the program. 
Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty 
positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both prior 
education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD did 
not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with 
joint specialty officers. 
Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience 
to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, 
DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to 
promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in fiscal year 
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2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will also have to 
complete DOD’s joint education program or otherwise meet the 
requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of officers 
promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124 officers promoted 
to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements. DOD has 
promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at rates 
equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers. However, DOD 
has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels and Navy captains.64 
Given the elapsed time from the date of Goldwater-Nichols enactment, GAO has 
taken a generous, non-accusatory line with respect to service non-compliance. As an 
example, the report’s executive summary merely observes, “The services vary in the 
emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle to balance 
joint requirements against their own service needs.”65 The report notes that DOD has 
frequently sought legislative relief from the act’s provisions66 and has even failed to 
adopt a comprehensive, strategic approach to identifying the number of joint specialty 
officers it needs.67  
Absent this fundamental consolidated guidance that must emanate from the 
offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
services, in fairness, are without a target for the number of officers that each will need to 
provide to fill out their fair share of joint billets. On the other hand, the requirement for 
every officer selected for promotion to flag or general officer level to have served 
successfully in a joint billet ought to serve as a well understood point of departure for 
service manpower planning.  
Monitoring the number of the billets authorized for flag and general officers is a 
task to which the services devote special and focused attention. This level of attention 
apparently does extend to tracking the most rudimentary data associated with compliance 
with Goldwater-Nichols mandates. It is almost inconceivable, that in a data inundated era 
characterized by almost slavish devotion to the establishment of a wide variety of 
performance metrics, GAO would find that “DOD has not been tracking certain data 
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consistently to measure its progress in meeting the act’s joint officer development 
objectives. For example, the four services have not kept historical data on the number of 
joint positions that are filled with joint specialty officers and joint specialty officer 
nominees. Without these data, DOD cannot assess the degree to which it is properly 
targeting its joint education programs.”68 This almost certainly represents non-
compliance with legislative intent through passive neglect. It does not bode well for an 
extension of the joint concept into the inter-agency sector.  
Given the evolving nature of a threat to the nation’s security whose defeat will 
require the closest collaboration between DOD and inter-agency actors, this recalcitrant, 
waiver-dotted approach to joint interoperability will need to be abandoned or overcome. 
The services have, unfortunately, compiled a deplorable record of seizing the initiative to 
organize in a manner best suited to leverage the unique capabilities of each in a 
synergistic and cost effective manner. Further civilian intervention in the form of 
legislative action will likely be required to bring about change. 
This transformation may also require a form of “disguising” suggested by 
Pierce.69 In this instance, the “disguise” would consist of altering in a seemingly 
evolutionary manner what is already familiar to the services without asking them to do 
more. Disguise might be affected, for instance, by adding significant inter-agency content 
to the joint professional military education (JPME) curriculum and by adding inter-
agency billets to the Joint Distribution Assignment List (JDAL) in which an officer could 
receive credit for completion of his or her joint service obligation. Additional 
requirements would not be levied on the individual services to provide officers for duty 
outside of their service specific career paths. Anticipating service push-back is critical, 
because history has demonstrated that it will come. So rather than “more,” the operative 
words need to be “instead of”. Given that the services are unhappy with the joint service 
obligation anyway, substitution of inter-agency duty should not be received as any more 
onerous.  
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Two actions would seem to be necessary to begin this process. One would be to 
amend the relevant provisions of Goldwater-Nichols Title IV Sections 401- 404 and the 
associated sections of US Code Title 10, extending the joint concept to include a new 
joint/inter-agency construct. The other would be to implement the following GAO 
recommendations incorporated in its 2002 report, which are specific to the joint world but 
clearly applicable to an expanded inter-agency conceptualization as well.  
These unambiguous and uncomplicated recommendations include: “the Secretary 
of Defense [should] direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission 
and goals. At a minimum, this plan should (1) identify the number of joint specialty 
officers needed, (2) include provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who 
are serving in joint organizations, and (3) be developed in a manner to provide DOD with 
more meaningful data to track progress made against the plan.”70 A coordinated, 
consolidated strategic plan with the unqualified backing of the Secretary of Defense is 
critical to moving forward by compelling the involvement of the services. Development 
and promulgation of such a plan would seem unequivocally consistent with other 
SECDEF transformational initiatives and directives.71  
But SECDEF direction alone may not be enough. Sadly, the civilian intervention 
cited by Barry Posen as the only reason military organizations innovate72 would appear to 
be applicable in the instance of expanding formal and sustained DOD engagement with 
its inter-agency counterparts if this final excerpt from the GAO study is any indicator 
(underscores added):  
We requested written comments from the Department of Defense, but 
none were provided. However, the Office of the Vice Director, Joint Staff, 
did provide us with DOD’s oral comments in which DOD partially 
concurred with our recommendation that it develop a strategic plan that 
links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals. 
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Moreover, DOD questioned whether there is a valid requirement for 
critical billets within joint organizations. DOD believes that the essential 
factors that should be considered to identify those officers who best meet 
the needs of a joint organization are service competencies and expertise in 
a military occupational skill. It stated that joint qualifications should be 
viewed as one of many attributes that can be used.73 
It does not appear as if the need for specialized skills applicable to the joint, let 
alone inter-agency environment is intuitive on its face. In a spirit more gracious than 
most might muster, GAO responded to this lack of courtesy and excuse-making by 
stating only that “we do not believe the act’s provisions prohibit DOD from developing a 
strategic plan to achieve its goals.”74 
Policy revision and legislative amendment aside, an underlying change in the 
military’s view of its inter-agency partners will be necessary. This constitutes a cultural 
change that may best be likened to a corporate merger. The literature would suggest that 
cultural change in organizations occurs only in a deliberate manner. Deliberate as in 
“slow” and deliberate as in “intentional”. A recent study by Thomas G. Mahnken and 
James R. FitzSimonds suggests that military officers, while almost uniformly enthusiastic 
about the prospects that technological advancements may have on the battlefield of the 
future, are never the less skeptical of the advantages believed to accrue from more 
generalized “transformational” initiatives.75  
In an era of potential terror attacks on the US Homeland, the type of 
transformation needed to counter the threat requires broader engagement with inter-
agency partners. Mahnken and FitzSimonds place much stock in the role of senior 
military officers in overcoming this ambivalence.76 This is consistent with the view 
expressed in a GAO study that identifies the two principal drivers of successful cultural 
change: “Top management must be totally committed to the change in both words and 
actions, and organizations must provide training that promotes and develops skills related 
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to their desired values and beliefs.”77 If, however, the senior leaders who must serve as 
change advocates within DOD have historically tended to undermine rather than promote 
change initiatives, then training and education must be called on to play an expanded 
role. Implementation of a coherent JPME training and education curriculum, derived 
from an analysis of mission essential tasks which span the entire DOD/inter-agency 
spectrum will be critical to achieving current transformational objectives. 
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V. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS 
As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the future of the US military is required to be 
joint. DOD understands this mandate. “Jointness will be central to the successful 
execution of future missions required of the U.S. Armed Forces and joint doctrine will 
assume increasing importance to the conduct of assigned missions. Consequently, if our 
armed forces are going to fight jointly, they must train jointly.”78 Devising a career 
progression that incorporates service in the joint arena and establishing training pipelines 
for officers assigned to joint billets has been reasonably well established by the various 
service components. What has not occurred is doctrinal recognition that the interface 
between DOD and the various inter-agency organizations now comprising the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the reorganized Intelligence Community 
has conferred an important new obligation on DOD.  DOD must train and prepare its 
most promising personnel for successful service alongside their counterparts in these 
various agencies. New training and assignment systems are required. 
The building blocks of developing such systems are the Joint Mission Essential 
Tasks (JMETs). The array of JMETs provides a comprehensive picture of the priority 
tasks a commander must perform to accomplish a particular mission. Taken together, the 
tasks associated with all of the commander’s missions constitute a Joint Mission Essential 
Task List (JMETL). The JMETL becomes the benchmark against which training 
requirements are established, and more importantly, funded. Professional skill sets 
derived from the JMETL can be generated on the basis of having completed the 
associated training. Officers who possess these skill sets can then be expected to serve 
successfully in task specific billets as these billets are established.  
JMETs are derived principally from military plans and orders and are revised as 
the plans are updated on a periodic basis. The development, revision, adoption, 
publication and implementation of JMETs typically lag the plan revision cycle. In the 
case of USNORTHCOM, charged with responsibility for HLD and HLS missions on 
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behalf of DOD, the core plans from which JMETs are typically derived have yet to be 
approved in final form at the SECDEF level. Though the development of draft JMETs 
has been proceeding on a basis concurrent with plan development, it is arguably almost 
certain that it will be many months before a final JMETL for USNORTHCOM will be 
approved and implemented. Identifying the HLD and HLS support tasks that officers 
must successfully perform with their inter-agency counterparts will need to proceed on an 
interim basis prior to incorporation in the USNORTHCOM JMETL. 
The identification of JMETs begins with the missions assigned to a military 
commander. Through the process of mission analysis, plans and orders are developed in 
accordance with and in the format prescribed by joint doctrine to accomplish these 
missions.79 Standardized JMET elements are drawn from the Universal Joint Task List 
(UJTL) that “provides an ordered listing of tasks describing the Armed Force's ability to perform 
activities or processes that joint force commanders require to execute their assigned missions.80 
Since the UJTL is founded on joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(JTTP), it provides a common language to describe the warfighting requirements of joint 
force commanders.”81  
The UJTL is organized on the basis of four conceptual levels of war – Strategic 
National (SN), Strategic Theater (ST), Operational (OP), and Tactical (TA).82 In 
practice, tasks are identified by these two letter designators. As described by the JMETL 
Handbook, “each prescribed task is further defined by a hierarchy of subordinate 
tasks”…each assigned a unique reference number.83 These tasks are then combined in a 
manner to comprise a working list of JMETs. Applying this procedure to 
USNORTHCOM, we find that USNORTHCOM’s mission is: “homeland defense and 
civil support, specifically [to]: 
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• Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed 
at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of 
responsibility; and  
• As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military 
assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations. 
U.S. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil 
support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be 
assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President.”84  
As this new command was first included in the Unified Command Plan in 2002,85 
joint doctrine has yet to provide specific guidance on how USNORTHCOM’s assigned 
missions are to be carried out in conjunction with inter-agency partners. The UJTL, 
which generally contemplates the operations of “pure” military forces, has not yet been 
tailored to reflect the type of hybrid organizational constructs that arise from the ongoing 
interaction of DOD forces and inter-agency personnel at USNORTHCOM. 
The JMETL Development Handbook does illustrate JMETs associated with the 
DOD conduct of humanitarian assistance missions abroad. For the purposes of 
illustration, this mission type might serve as a surrogate for identifying the JMETs 
associated with a DOD mission conducted in response to a domestic natural disaster or 
terrorist attack.86 This is a type mission that USNORTHCOM might be called on to 
perform.  
Continuing the illustration, whether abroad or at home, mission tasking would be 
initiated by the Secretary of Defense and further assigned for accomplishment to a Joint 
Task Force Commander. Key elements of the underlying Concepts of Operations for both 
types of events would likely be very similar: Assist local authorities in providing security, 
assist in combating disease, and provide [and distribute] relief supplies.87  
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In each instance, the mission commander would flesh out the plan detail by 
referring to the UJTL and identifying the essential joint mission tasks. The domestic 
environment would be characterized by the presence of a variety of first responders. 
Those on scene might include personnel from local fire and law enforcement, state 
National Guard and emergency preparedness organizations, FEMA, and various Non-
Government and private relief organizations. In this example, a JMET might, therefore, 
be crafted as a modification, incorporating inter-agency specific content, of the 
operational level task OP 5.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Operational Forces along the 
lines of OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations.88  
The “direct/coordinate” distinction is important. Military officers are trained to 
exercise initiative and assume command in dynamic operational environments. In a civil 
support engagement they are precluded in many instances by law and almost always by 
protocol from assuming command of anything or anybody. These constraints dictate that 
military officers deployed to these types of situations must be conversant by virtue of 
their training with the legal limits imposed on their involvement. They must also be 
familiar with the roles and missions of their inter-agency partners.  Most importantly, 
they must be effective in providing support to the personnel of agencies and 
organizations who may approach their duties differently than other DOD personnel 
steeped in a joint military culture.  
At more senior levels, frequently far from the front lines of the HLD/HLS “fight,” 
military officers who are accustomed to written and unwritten rules and roles that accord 
decision making deference to rank and theater experience, may find interaction with their 
inter-agency counterparts to be exceedingly difficult. The planning processes that they 
encounter are likely to be less well-defined, decision points and decision makers more 
difficult to identify, and the pace of operations significantly different from that 
experienced in either a service component or joint headquarters. It is imperative, then, 
that prior to being offered a senior leadership (O-6 and above) assignment in the 
HLD/HLS arena, officers must have developed specialized inter-agency expertise at the 
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junior officer level commensurate with the service specific experience required for 
advancement within their own service. The military has established well understood 
career paths for officers with differing designators or occupational specialties. In the 
DOD/inter-agency arena, these paths have yet to be created.  
For these paths to emerge, a serious effort must be mounted to identify the JMETs 
that will form the basis for the training that will be required. USNORTHCOM is the 
logical choice to serve as Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this initiative. At 
present, the effort is being undertaken in conjunction with the development of the 
command’s initial Concept of Operations Plan 2002, currently awaiting SECDEF 
approval. This CONOPS has been difficult to develop partly due to the absence of well 
defined operational linkages that USNORTHCOM must establish with its inter-agency 
partners. 
Final approval of the CONOPS will provide a baseline for determining those 
essential tasks that military officers will need to perform not only at USNORTHCOM but 
anywhere DOD personnel may be assigned as action officers or as liaison officers with 
inter-agency organizations. This includes, for example, the agencies comprising DHS, 
federal law enforcement agencies not included in DHS, and state or major metropolitan 
emergency operations centers. Additionally, the long term assignment of properly trained 
active duty military personnel to the headquarters and rapid deployment elements of state 
National Guard forces would appear to add significant value in expediting timely 
response and in fostering closer coordination between these forces in the event of a 
contingency.  
To date, National Guard forces have served effectively in an active duty status at 
USNORTHCOM - the Chief of Staff position is programmed for a National Guard Major 
General on active duty orders - but the type of advances in information and culture 
sharing that could be realized by a regular cross pollination of active duty officers serving 
on an extended basis with National Guard units has not occurred. The genuinely radical 
concept, a form of disruptive innovation, would be for these types of assignments to be 
designated as joint billets, conceivably filled by officers from any of the service branches. 
To be successful in these types of assignments, active duty and National Guard officers 
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will need to complete similar training, derived from a common JMETL that incorporates 
an inter-agency perspective. 
Digging deeply into the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) from which the JMETs 
are derived would suggest that there are gaps in the master list where the new missions 
assigned to USNORTHCOM have not been contemplated. The UJTL is largely DOD 
centric and only cursory consideration is given to inter-agency missions. A point of 
departure for closing these gaps would appear to be in the realm of those tasks listed in 
the Strategic National (SN) series summarized here: 89 
SN 8.2 PROVIDE DOD/GOVERNMENT-WIDE SUPPORT 
SN 8.2.1 SUPPORT DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES 
SN 8.2.2 SUPPORT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
SN 8.2.3 SUPPORT EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS FROM 
THEATERS 
SN 8.2.4 ASSIST CIVIL DEFENSE  
SN 8.3 COORDINATE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE 
INTER-AGENCY PROCESS  
SN 8.3.1 COORDINATE AND CONTROL POLICY FOR THE 
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 
SN 8.3.2 CONDUCT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN THE 
INTER-AGENCY PROCESS  
SN 8.3.3 ESTABLISH INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION 
STRUCTURES 
SN 8.3.4 COORDINATE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM) IN 
THE INTER-AGENCY ARENA (SEE: SN 9.2.2)  
SN 8.3.5 COORDINATE DOD/GOVERNMENT INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS (IO) 
 
These generic tasks must be converted to USNORTHCOM specific JMETs, performance 
metrics established, CJCS approval obtained, and training designed and delivered. UJTL 
entries directed at facilitating DOD interaction with inter-agency organizations beyond 
USNORTHCOM will have to be developed from a standing start perhaps by using 
USNORTHCOM experience and JMET development efforts as a guide.  
Integrating DOD specific and inter-agency tasks might begin by integrating tasks 
incorporated in the DOD UJTL with those included in the DHS Office for Domestic 
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Preparedness (ODP) Universal Task List (UTL) 90 and Target Capabilities Lists (TCL).91 
These documents are now under “spiral” or iterative development by ODP. The process 
is moving quickly. ODP disseminated Version 2.1 of the UTL in April of 2005, 
superceding Version 2.0 published in December of 2004. The newer version scraps the 
initial tiered approach that had mirrored DOD’s four levels of war hierarchy employed in 
the formulation of the UJTL as described earlier. The tasks comprising the current 
version of ODP’s UTL are segregated into four principal mission categories instead: 
Prevent, Protect, Respond and Recover.92 This format aligns well and naturally with 
USNORTHCOM’s missions to Deter, Prevent, Defeat, and Mitigate [the effects of] 
terrorist attacks.    
The overall purpose of the ODP UTL is to produce enhanced preparedness by 
providing a rational approach to task identification and training across the inter-agency 
spectrum. The initial objective was to develop a minimum number of credible scenarios 
that covered the range of response requirements. While it is unlikely that any of these 
specific scenarios would unfold as described, in theory, a nation prepared for these 
scenarios would be prepared for almost all likely eventualities.  
It was important for DHS to get a planning concept on the street quickly even 
though follow on refinement would be required. The spiral development aspect of the two 
UTL versions is readily apparent. Version 2.0 was designed to “provide a comprehensive 
menu of tasks that [could] be performed in the major events illustrated by the National 
Planning Scenarios.”93  Thirteen of the 15 scenarios involve other than natural 
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occurrences. Version 2.0 “sort[ed] tasks by scenario, mission, function, and level of 
government that generally perform[ed] the task.”94 Version 2.1 is described as follows:  
Development of the UTL started with 15 scenarios developed by a federal 
inter-agency group for the Homeland Security Council. Analysts and 
subject matter experts reviewed each scenario and developed a list of tasks 
that are required to effectively prevent and respond to the incident. These 
task lists were vetted through federal, state, and local officials and 
practitioners.95 
The UTL emanates from the National Preparedness mission that is designed to 
“prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies.” 96 It is specifically not oriented toward DOD’s HLD 
mission of Deterring, Preventing, and Defeating adversaries approaching the homeland 
from abroad. While the UTL is clearly not intended to be prescriptive with respect to who 
should take on specific tasks nor how these tasks should be accomplished, a close reading 
suggests that DOD is well suited to undertake a number of them. As one example, the 
UTL task Pre A: Detect Threats, Pre.A.1: Direct Intelligence Activities (Function 1),97 is 
clearly in DOD’s lane as a supporting element to DHS and its intelligence operations. 
This may become even more so as the new Director of National Intelligence commences 
his oversight duties in regard to the US national intelligence community.  
UTL tasks are directly related to the ODP Target Capabilities List (TCL). 
“Critical tasks are synonymous with ‘mission-essential tasks… the TCL, identifies the 
capabilities to perform the critical tasks…A capability provides a means to achieve a 
measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more critical task(s), under 
specified conditions and performance standards.’”98 Further, “the TCL is designed to 
assist jurisdictions and agencies in understanding and defining their respective roles in a 
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major event, the capabilities required to perform a specified set of tasks, and where to 
obtain additional resources if needed.”99   
The DHS and DOD task list formats are very similar. As JMETs are derived from 
the UJTL and represent a greater level of specificity, the TCL gives similarly detailed 
expression to the critical tasks identified by the UTL. As an example, the UTL Prevent 
Task Pre A: Detect Threats, is amplified in the TCL by three Target Capabilities: 
Information Collection and Threat Recognition, Intelligence Fusion and Analysis, and 
Information Sharing and Collaboration.100  
Each Target Capability, in turn, consists of the following succinctly stated and 
discrete components:  
• Capability Description  
• Outcome 
• ESF Annex Cross-Reference  
• UTL Taxonomy Location  
• Capability and Performance Measures 
• Capability Elements consisting of  
o Personnel 
o Planning 
o Organization and Leadership 
o Equipment and Systems 
o Training and Exercise Requirements 
o Linked Capabilities 
o Event Conditions and References.  
The DHS Target Capabilities Lists are remarkably well developed and coherently 
aligned with the Universal Task Lists. These lists are immediately available for 
integration with DOD UJTLs/JMETLs. For instance, as JMETs are developed to reflect 
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an expanded scope of inter-agency operations, a starting point might be the UTL Prevent 
Mission (4.0 series). These tasks include:  
 4A: Detect Threats 
4A.1 Direct Intelligence Activities 
4A.2  Manage Data Collection 
4A.3 Process Data Into Intelligence 
4A.4 Analyze Intelligence 
4A.5 Disseminate Threat Information  
4C: Eliminate Threats 
4C.2 Seize Materials 
4C.3 Defeat Weapons 
4C.4.Disrupt Sources of Support101 
 
Item 4C.4 is an example of an action where close DOD collaboration with other 
inter-agency partners could prove particularly effective. Important roles could be played 
by DOD in terms of launching a direct military attack on terrorist facilitators, or by the 
Department of State (DOS) in terms of applying diplomatic pressure on state terror 
sponsors, or by the Department of Treasury in terms of seizing or freezing terrorist 
financial assets. The nature of the current asymmetric threat faced by the US dictates a 
collaborative and innovative approach to confronting the adversary and the full 
employment of all elements of national power. DOD needs to adapt to this new defense 
reality and develop the capabilities necessary to support the efforts of other departments 
and agencies in fullest measure.  
DOD, arguably, has roles to play in other DHS defined missions as well. The 
UTL Protect (5.0) mission, for example, includes subsets 5A Assess Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets, 5B Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, and 5C 
Mitigate Risks to the Public. Specific DOD roles can be readily identified in conjunction 
with: 
5A.1 Identify Assets  
5A.2 Assess Vulnerabilities 
5B.1 Implement Protection Measures 
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5B.2 Protect Assets and Property 
5C.2 Provide Public Safety102 
This particular UTL mission offers some robust opportunities for DOD 
involvement. DOD is already actively involved in Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments and in the development and maintenance of Critical Infrastructure data 
bases. Other examples from the detailed task level of the UTL Protect mission include 
“develop partnerships for physical infrastructure protection and contingency planning, 
[and] implement deterrence and defense protection measures.103” Another is “plan and 
prepare for pandemic influenza.”104 This mission would presumably extend to other 
catastrophic outbreaks of disease whether naturally occurring or terrorist induced. 
DOD has a longstanding association with missions now termed Defense Support 
to Civil Authorities (DSCA). These are classic but collateral involvements with tasks 
involving natural disaster response – hurricanes, floods, wild land fires, and earthquakes. 
The emergence of a potentially devastating terrorist threat has elevated the importance of 
these response missions.. These missions must be addressed in DOD planning and 
preparation and addressed in the formulation of JMETs. Natural points of entry for DOD 
in the UTL Respond (6.0) Mission category include: 
 6A: Assess Incident 
6A.1 Investigate Incident 
6A.2 Assess Hazards and Consequences 
6B: Minimize Incident 
6B.1 Manage Incident 
6B.2 Respond to Hazard 
6B.3 Implement protective Actions 
6B.4 Conduct Search and Rescue 
6C: Care for the Public 
6C.1 Provide Medical Care 
6C.2 Distribute Prophylaxis 
6C.3 Provide Mass Care 
6C.4 Manage Facilities105 
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DOD has historically designated specific military units to undertake a number of 
these missions. For instance USNORTHCOM’s Joint Task Force – Civil Support is 
organized to conduct operations in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear and high Explosive (CBRNE) attacks. Additionally, the United States Marine 
Corps maintains the only standing Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force 
(CBIRF), a company sized unit garrisoned at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian 
Head, MD.  
More generalized DOD civil support roles not involving CBRNE events have 
traditionally been played by National Guard forces deployed on state or federal active 
duty orders. Converting previously specialized mission sets like CBRNE response to core 
competencies for all DOD elements including the National Guard provides an 
opportunity for force transformation. This transformation is driven not by service choice 
but by the evolving nature of the threat to the US Homeland. Adequate threat response 
may require the rapid deployment of a ready force for an extended period in support of a 
lead federal agency or state and local first responders. Expanding the capabilities of all 
DOD units would increase the likelihood that missions of this type could be successfully 
accomplished. The creation and deployment of the National Guard’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction – Civil Support Teams represents a good first step. 
DOD is likely to have only the most minimal role in the UTL Recover (7.0) 
mission, described in the National Response Plan as “The development, coordination, and 
execution of service- and site-restoration plans and the reconstitution of government 
operations and services through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public 
assistance programs.”106 While the potential exists for DOD involvement in the 
reconstitution of government mission, perhaps through the establishment and 
maintenance of secure communication systems or the provision of site security, the 
development of specific JMETs associated with this mission might be held in abeyance 
pending the incorporation of higher priority UTL specified tasks as outlined above into 
the DOD UJTL/JMET mix.  
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Creating an integrated list of UTL and UJTL tasks to guide DOD mission 
definition and development in an environment of expanded and continuous interaction 
with inter-agency partners demands thoughtful evaluation. The task also demands the 
presence of an implementation champion. Pierce would suggest that there are two factors 
related to disruptive innovation that would be helpful in achieving these objectives. First 
is the creation of a small group focused exclusively (or almost so) on developing and 
introducing innovative practices. Second the group’s practices should be portrayed as 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary - as an extension of current missions rather than as 
the adoption of an entirely new way of conducting military operations.107  Such an 
organization exists and is actively involved with developing JMETs at USNORTHCOM - 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N).  
As described previously, SJFHQ-N is a small cadre of seasoned military and 
civilian personnel possessing a wide variety of specialized skills. Established at the 
specific direction of the Secretary of Defense, SJFHQ-N is a self contained and self-
sustaining organization. While certain of its analysis, planning and operating activities 
parallel those of other USNORTHCOM staff directorates, SJFHQ-N is distinguished by 
the undivided attention it devotes to the Commander’s highest priority mission or focus 
area. SJFHQ-N is equipped for rapid deployment should the need arise. It has 
demonstrated this capability in support of the 2004 G-8 Summit, the Reagan funeral, the 
national political conventions and the 2005 presidential inauguration as well as in certain 
operational environments associated with heightened threat levels.108   
SJFHQ-N’s mission statement reads: “The mission of SJFHQ-N is to maintain 
situational understanding of the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order 
to enable rapid transition to a contingency response posture, and when directed, rapidly 
deploy a joint command and control element to support homeland defense and civil 
support operations in order to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate crises in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR.”109 Led by an Air Force Brigadier General, SJFHQ-N is 
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comprised of 64 personnel: 39 military, 22 federal civil service (GS), and 3 contractors. 
SJFHQ-N is purple or joint in the sense that all services are represented in the 
directorate’s manning document. As a new organization for a new era, it is also tartan, or 
inter-agency oriented, with permanently assigned personnel experienced in National 
Guard, USCG, local law enforcement, and other federal inter-agency operations.  
Given SJFHQ-N’s staff composition and the operational experience of its 
members alongside inter-agency partners, SJFHQ-N personnel are well positioned to 
evaluate proposed JMETs that are applicable not only to USNORTHCOM but to all of 
DOD. These JMETs might be relevant to the training of all military officers selected for 
assignment to DOD units with significant inter-agency roles and missions. The ensuing 
chapter will explore the roles of USNORTHCOM and SJFHQ-N in assessing the 
applicability of certain proposed JMETs to DOD/inter-agency operations and will further 






VI. EVALUATING JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS 
By virtue of its operational experience gained in support of National Special 
Security Events and by its assigned mission set involving close coordination with inter-
agency partners, USNORTHCOM generally and SJFHQ-N specifically, are well suited to 
serve as the test platform for the evaluation of inter-agency oriented Universal Joint 
Tasks and Joint Mission Essential Tasks (UJTs/JMETs) applicable to all of DOD. 
In and of itself, USNORTHCOM represents a new organizational form, an 
example of a sustaining innovation. Prior to 9/11/2001, DOD responsibilities for 
HLD/HLS had been widely decentralized among several entities which complicated the 
overall command and control posture at the height of the crisis and resulted in degraded 
unity of effort. USNORTHCOM commenced operations on 01 October, 2002, and 
attained full operational capability on September 11, 2003. In conjunction with the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security, USNORTHCOM is charged with 
responsibility for implementing actions to achieve the objectives set forth in the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security: “To prevent terrorist attacks within the United states; 
[to] reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and [to] minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.”110  
Not everyone is thrilled to have DOD as a partner. The Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) mission is one that DOD has always approached as a collateral and 
generally uninteresting element of its overall mission set. Arguably, fighting wildfires 
and cleaning up after hurricanes is not as glamorous as fighting the nation’s armed 
enemies. For warriors, DSCA operations have been neither professionally stimulating nor 
career enhancing. The GAO noted as recently as 2003, that “When performing domestic 
military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills 
through practice in normal training. Domestic missions to date have required only basic 
military skills and thus offered limited training value, which can have an adverse affect 
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on unit readiness.”111 It is axiomatic that unit commanders whose units maintain high 
levels of readiness tend to be promoted.  
DOD’s grudging acceptance of DSCA missions is indicated by the fact that it 
“has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally remains organized, 
trained and equipped to fight military adversaries overseas.”112 This view, coupled with 
the inter-agencies’ reluctant acceptance of their oversized cousin’s slow and frequently 
overbearing response to calls for assistance, as exemplified by the Los Angeles Riots in 
1992,113  suggests that the ready and effective inter-agency collaboration envisioned by 
Congress has often resembled a romance among porcupines. As further evidenced in the 
security preparations for the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, the command and 
control issue of “who’s in charge?” is frequently a sticking point.114  
USNORTHCOM has been experimenting with organizational alignments and 
technological innovations to facilitate arriving sooner at the site of an emerging incident 
with better situational understanding and with properly tailored forces. The intent is to 
swiftly accomplish assigned missions with minimal adverse impact on local communities 
and on the sensibilities of other responding agencies. With attractive targets for terrorist 
attacks in every geographic sector, USNORTHCOM has set a priority for deploying an 
advance command and control element to events and locations where DOD forces have 
been requested or may be required on short notice. Specific examples include designated 
National Special Security Events (NSSEs), adverse weather emergency operations and 
consequence management centers, and potentially lucrative sites for terror attacks – 
major sporting venues, urban centers and transportation hubs.  
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The general USNORTHCOM concept is to have DOD liaison officers and mid-
level decision makers in place for the purpose of establishing working relationships with 
local inter-agency representatives and first responders ahead of a potential request for 
DOD assistance. Once on scene, DOD will clearly remain in support of a designated lead 
federal agency, but will commence parallel pre-crisis planning based upon a boots on the 
ground view of a situation as it develops. This approach should shorten the response time 
should DOD assistance be requested. The transition from state and local first responders 
having a situation under control to requiring a material helping hand from DOD can 
occur swiftly. It may best be characterized by the baseball analogy of infielders and 
outfielders converging on a softly hit pop fly – an “I’ve got it, I’ve got it…..you take it” 
ball. Essentially, bad things can happen fast. 
As discussed, USNORTHCOM’s approach to anticipating these types of 
situations has been to establish a rapidly deployable command element, SJFHQ-N. This 
staff directorate is trained and equipped to provide interoperable communications support 
and a robust command and control “reach-back” capability to the USNORTHCOM 
headquarters. SJFHQ-N is “standing” in the sense that its personnel are not drawn from 
other staff directorates on a collateral duty, as needed, basis but are, instead, permanently 
assigned.115 SJFHQ-N is intended to move out on short notice to provide an immediate 
DOD presence at the site of a disaster or in advance of a potential crisis that might call 
for the mobilization of a more robust Joint Task Force (JTF). The concept is for the 
SJFHQ-N advance element to travel to the designated site, marry up with its van based 
communications suite, and commence full scope operations without assistance from other 
units or inter-agency partners.  
To recap, three events in the summer of 2004 provided opportunities to test this 
operational concept – the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the Democratic National 
Convention (DNC) in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Republican National Convention 
(RNC) in New York City. At each of these NSSE’s, SJFHQ-N personnel provided direct 
support to the United States Secret Service (USSS) in its capacity as the lead federal 
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agency, as well as to state and local first responders. Each event enabled SJFHQ-N to 
evaluate the connectivity and sustainability of its communications systems and to assess 
the requirements for operator training, equipment maintenance, and crew support in an 
inter-agency environment. These events served as mini-case studies for identifying and 
validating proposed USNORTHCOM UJT/JMETs.  
The field experiences at the G-8 tended to corroborate previous exercise and real-
world operational findings. These would suggest that improvements in technological 
capability frequently outpace operator training and the development of procedures for 
informed systems’ employment. For example, the SJFHQ-N Communications Officer’s 
after-action report noted that bringing the communications van’s equipment on-line was 
degraded in that, “JCSC [Joint Communication Support Center] staffs assigned to operate 
the van were not familiar with the equipment onboard.”116 Even if the equipment itself 
had been fully functioning, the task of seamlessly incorporating the van into the G-8 
operation would have encountered challenges associated with “the planning phases to 
develop communication plans, [and] frequency plans as required for each 
deployment.”117  This shortcoming is directly associated with certain Universal Joint 
Tasks such as SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process, 
ST 5.1 Operate and Manage Theater C4I Environment, and OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of 
Communicating Operational Information. 
The G-8 experience demonstrated that to realize the transformational benefits of a 
standing fly-away force, assigned crews would need to be self-sufficient from a 
habitability stand-point and would need to be conversant not only with the technical 
aspects of their equipment but also with the types of operations likely to be encountered. 
They would need to be cross-trained and familiar with their mission, the commander’s 
expectations, and the specific tasks to be performed. Further, they would need to be fully 
prepared in accordance with UJTs such as SN8.3 Coordinate Military Activities within 
the Inter-agency process. 
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Certain changes to the SJFHQ-N concept of operations were implemented for the 
Democratic National Convention (DNC) At the DNC, SJFHQ-N personnel and their 
communications van were collocated with the Multi-Agency Coordination Center 
(MACC) – this was not designated as a military type “Command Center” - in Cambridge, 
across the river from the convention’s main site. SJFHQ-N’s principal role was to serve 
as an unclassified and secure communications hub in support of the JTF Commander who 
maintained his own headquarters in Milford, MA. The SJFHQ-N liaison officers worked 
out of the headquarters complex and the MACC while their communications van was 
staffed with two officers from the USNORTHCOM Operations (J-3) directorate and a 
qualified JCSC systems technician.  
As at the G-8, the JTF Commander was a Massachusetts National Guard 
Brigadier General who was granted special presidential authority to concurrently 
command both National Guard and Regular Active Duty forces in support of the US 
Secret Service. As an example of the type of unique capability that DOD can offer its 
inter-agency partners, SJFHQ-N’s van provided the JTF Commander with a sophisticated 
communications suite that would not have been available to him in his National Guard 
capacity alone. The van served as a key link for secure and non-secure voice 
communications among the various inter-agency participants including DOD, FBI and 
USSS. Overall system connectivity was superior to that experienced at the G-8.118 This 
improvement would appear to be attributable largely to better preparation, timely 
development and circulation of a comprehensive communications plan, and the 
availability of technicians more thoroughly familiar with the initiation and operation of 
the van’s installed equipment.   
The command and control arrangement specially authorized by the President for 
trial at the G-8 and exercised for only the second time at the DNC is an example of the 
type of inter-agency cooperation reflected in UJT 8.3.3 Establish Inter-agency 
Cooperation Structures. The concurrent command arrangement could be construed as 
conceptually disruptive. It offers the real possibility for DOD to establish the type of 
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relationships with state and local first responders that are perceived at the local level as 
genuinely adding value. Now, when requested, DOD forces are prepared to arrive in a 
timely and predictable manner, with equipment designed to serve state and local 
personnel, and with the potential conflict between National Guard and active duty 
commanders as to “who’s in charge?” already resolved.  
At the RNC, SJFHQ-N personnel were staged at the Seventh Regiment Armory 
on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. The command arrangement was similar to that 
employed at the DNC. A New York Army National Guard Colonel was assigned under 
special presidential authority as the JTF Commander in command of both National Guard 
and active duty forces. His deputy was the same SJFHQ-N active duty US Navy Captain 
who had performed these duties at the DNC. Additional SJFHQ-N support was provided 
by 18 other military and civilian personnel serving in the JTF’s personnel, intelligence, 
and operations directorates as well as in the MACC. Communications and Public Affairs 
support was provided by staff from other USNORTHCOM directorates. Lessons learned 
again underscored the importance of advance planning with inter-agency partners and 
synchronization of communications arrangements at the unclassified level to permit full 
information sharing between DOD and inter-agency participants. These lessons are 
applicable to all of DOD and will need to be translated into UJT/JMETs. 
The critical importance of establishing standardized JMETS was highlighted by 
an After Action comment provided by a USAF O-5: “Personnel assigned to the various 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) were not properly trained on procedures they 
needed to perform in support of Lead Federal Agencies or the JTF-HQ… During the 
RNC, multiple instances of personnel deferring requests for information to personnel not 
on duty hindered support to Lead Federal Agencies and/or JTF Assigned Organizations.  
Many personnel were unaware of their specific duty requirements and 
responsibilities.”119   
The same officer, recognizing the impact of cultural differences between DOD 
elements and inter-agency partners, observed: “JTFs must bear in mind that means and 
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ways in which the military expresses information do not translate well to civilian 
agencies.  The CCIR [Commander’s Critical Information Requirements] issue attempting 
to quantify police commitment of forces and reserves is one example.  Because the CCIR 
as phrased had no meaning to NYPD, the CCIR was unanswerable hence useless until 
modified.”120 His recommended solution is straight forward enough but has yet to be 
codified in UJT/JMET form: “JTF and NC staffs must be alert for communications 
failures caused by institutional cultural differences and willing to modify our intended 
message when such disconnects are identified.”121 This would seem to fall within the 
scope of SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process. It is 
axiomatic that effective information management begins with speaking the same 
operational language. 
 The twenty-three SJFHQ-N personnel who deployed in support of the 
Presidential Inauguration in January, 2005 experimented with yet another form of 
command relationships. While the USSS served again as the Lead Federal Agency, local 
DOD command was exercised by Commander, Standing Joint Force Headquarters 
National Capital Region, a designated USNORTHCOM subordinate command. Naming 
SJFHQ-NCR as the on scene commander reduced certain operational complexities. 
Conducting support operations in the heart of the nation’s capital, however, opened the 
door to significant coordination obligations with other federal agencies and with a 
plethora of first responder organizations representing adjacent and frequently overlapping 
jurisdictions. Key lessons learned were not dissimilar to those recorded following the 
DNC and RNC and represented instances where a full operational understanding of UJTs 
SN 8.2 Provide DOD/Government Wide Support and SN 8.2.2 Support Other 
Government Agencies could only be considered as essential to successful mission 
accomplishment.    
These recent SJFHQ-N deployments in support of high visibility inter-agency 
operations have provided an opportunity for the participants to identify and evaluate 
potential UJT/JMETS in a field setting. To take full advantage of the perspective and 
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experience gained by those assigned to these operations, SJFHQ-N personnel who 
deployed from the USNORTHCOM headquarters in support of the G-8, DNC, RNC, and 
2005 Presidential Inauguration were surveyed in conjunction with this thesis. The 
respondents comprised a group with broadly based, current and relevant experience in 
serving shoulder to shoulder alongside of their inter-agency counterparts. The survey 
form employed and the data collected appears as Appendix I.  
The survey results suggest that the UJT/JMETs comprising the SN 8.2 Provide 
DOD/Government Wide Support and SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the 
Inter-agency Process series are of significant importance to USNORTHCOM and to the 
effective conduct of DOD/inter-agency operations. The results also suggest that the 
delivery of training in these essential tasks is lagging.  
The notable exception to the importance of the tasks comprising the survey set 
was SN 8.2.3 Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters. This task is 
traditionally identified with Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) – the 
management of refugees fleeing the scene of hostilities. It would not be hard to envision, 
however, that this task might be of great importance were a terrorist attack involving 
employment of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) to occur in a major metropolitan 
location.  
This observation would seem to be corroborated by the high value those surveyed 
placed on task SN 8.3.4 Coordinate Consequence Management (CM) in the Inter-agency 
Arena in terms of its importance to USNORTHCOM.122 A perceived lack of formal 
training in this task,123 however, was only partially offset by previous on the job training 
(OJT)124 and by specific pre-deployment training.125. On balance, it appears as if a 
greater emphasis on pre-deployment training in all of the tasks comprising the survey 
would be beneficial.126 It is important to note that with respect to all of the tasks 
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evaluated, formal training of the type that would be incorporated in future Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) curricula, has not yet been delivered.127  
Survey results would indicate that the respondents viewed the survey task set as 
being of greater importance to USNORTHCOM’s HLS mission than to its HLD mission. 
The only average score to rank higher for HLD than HLS was recorded for task SN 8.2.1 
Support DOD and Joint Agencies. The critical importance of communications to effective 
mission performance in either the HLD or HLS sphere was highlighted by the scores 
awarded to SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Inter-agency Process.128 
Unsurprisingly, the overall importance of information management to successful inter-
agency engagement was reflected in the responses provided when participants were asked 
to evaluate the tasks they had actually performed in the context of “Value of this 
UJT/JMET to effective inter-agency operations.”129 This score, the highest recorded, is 
consistent with the types of comments included in the various NSSE after action reviews 
reported earlier and represents the view of personnel serving in operational roles – not 
merely those associated with technical communications support.  
The importance of these tasks to actually accomplishing missions in a field 
environment where DOD personnel operate alongside of their inter-agency counterparts 
on a 24/7 basis cannot be overemphasized. Two questions asked respondents to evaluate 
the survey task set in the context of an operational setting: “Importance [of a particular 
task] to the accomplishment of this [NSSE] mission” and “Importance to performance of 
my duties while deployed.” When compared with the responses to the question 
“Importance to [the] performance of my duties while at HQ”, the scores assigned to every 
task but one, SN 8.3.1 Coordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations, 
outpaced the scores assigned to duties performed in the headquarters environment. This 
suggests that personnel called on to fulfill DOD roles in an inter-agency environment 
recognize that the identification of  unique skills required for the performance of specific 
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operational tasks is imperative, while policy development and headquarters staffing 
responsibilities draw on more generalized skills and experience. 
Discerning the importance of these skills and valuing them institutionally are two 
different matters. It is interesting to note, and consistent with expectations, that in the 
case of every task included in the survey, respondents recorded higher scores in response 
to the questions “Value of this UJT/JMET to USNORTHCOM” and “Value of this 
UJT/JMET to effective inter-agency operations” than to the question “Value of this 
UJT/JMET to my own service component (USA, USN) etc.” The lowest scores in 
response to the service component question were reported by a USN O-5 and a USAF O-
5, both of whom are dependent for continued promotion on the view that the senior 
members of their selection boards might hold regarding the relative importance of inter-
agency involvement. This result is telling and speaks volumes as to the importance of 
providing career protection for officers called to serve in an inter-agency environment. It 
suggests, for example, that legislative top cover in the form of an amendment to 
Goldwater-Nichols extending the act’s provisions to encompass service with inter-agency 
organizations may more than be in order.  
The USNORTHCOM “battlefield” extends from the nation’s heartland to the 
most remote terrorist camp and therefore requires the active integration of non-DOD 
inter-agency players in ways and to an extent not common to the other Regional 
Combatant Commands. Joint Publication 3-0 states: “Combatant commanders [all of 
them – author’s addition] and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) are likely to 
operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign 
governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations in a variety of 
circumstances. The intrinsic nature of inter-agency coordination demands that 
commanders and joint force planners consider all instruments of national power and 
recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the 
objective. Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies’ different and sometimes 
conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques.”130  
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In a Joint Publication 3.0 comparative table that describes the differences between 20th 
and 21st Century Characteristics of US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution, the 
characteristic of Inter-agency “Coordination” is superceded by Integrated Agency 
“Actions” and Strategic Deterrence as Homeland Defense is replaced by 
proactive/preemptive Homeland Security.131  The intent is to “secure [the] US homeland 
and key strategic nodes, to reduce the effectiveness of enemy asymmetric approaches 
while maintaining relentless, forward operational pressure to preempt enemy efforts.”132 
Accomplishing this mission will require the development of sound doctrine, the training 
and assignment of well-qualified personnel, and the deployment of new supporting 
technologies. Properly crafted JMETs derived from relevant UJTs will form the principal 
building blocks for all of these efforts, but training will always remain in the forefront. 
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VII. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
The type of training that offers an opportunity to effect broadly based and long-
lasting cultural change and assimilation among people of differing organizations will 
need to find its way into the curricula of the schools offering Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME). JPME specified by Goldwater-Nichols at Section 401 is structured, 
within the five identified levels of professional military education, in two principal 
phases, JPME Phase I and JPME Phase II.  To be designated as a Joint Specialty Officer 
(JSO) an officer must complete both phases and successfully complete a 24 month tour of 
duty in a designated joint billet as included in the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). 
This is a rigorous requirement. The demands of mastering the professional skills required 
by his or her service component and serving in positions of increasing responsibility to 
prepare for command assignments compete for every hour of the military officer’s 
attention. Finding the time for officers to complete the JPME coursework and finding the 
opportunities for meaningful service within the JDAL are challenging enough. Getting 
the curriculum content right to prepare officers for effective service in complex joint and 
inter-agency environments is daunting. 
The most recent Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s Instruction governing the 
delivery of professional military education reflects the evolving priorities of the 2004 
National Military Strategy.133 This instruction incorporates new JPME standards 
intended to span all five levels of the professional military education continuum. The first 
of the standards asserts: “JPME curricula should prepare graduates to operate in a joint, 
inter-agency and multinational environment…”134 Specific instruction in inter-agency 
concepts, however, does not appear as a Joint Emphasis curriculum requirement until 
JPME Phase II.135 (The curriculum structure contemplates delivery of this content at 
intermediate or senior level service schools offering JPME Phase I and II). Learning Area 
1 at the intermediate level is intended to ensure that students “Comprehend how the US 
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military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, inter-agency and 
multinational operations.”136 At the senior level, the focus of Learning Area 2 is to 
“analyze how the inter-agency’s structure and processes influence the planning for and 
application of the military instrument of national power,”137 while Learning Area 4 
emphasizes “apprais[ing] processes for coordinating US military plans and actions 
effectively with forces from other countries and with inter-agency and non-governmental 
organizations to include homeland security and defense.”138 
While the formal designation of content related to inter-agency roles in the 
HLD/HLS environment represents a breakthrough of sorts, it never the less indicates that 
full scope inter-agency integration as a service way of life has yet to be entirely 
embraced. JPME is still DOD, albeit, joint-DOD, centric, in compliance with the strict 
statutory requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. This, in turn, suggests a need to expand the 
provisions of the Act to directly address inter-agency engagement as an integral aspect of 
joint operations - to make the services tartan instead of purple.  
Prior guidance suggests that inter-agency familiarization has a place in all 
professional military education levels. The Joint Training Plan stipulates that 
“Commanders will train the way they intend to fight.”139  It acknowledges as well that 
“Inherent to military operations is the need to work with other US Government (USG) 
agencies or other nations’ governments, as well as with Nongovernmental Organizations 
(NGO), and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO). Joint training and exercise programs 
should maximize interaction with the organizations and people likely to be involved in 
assigned mission(s) across the range of military operations. Commanders should 
emphasize and develop individual as well as collective skills.”140   
A draft revision of the Joint Training Plan, dated July 31, 2004, goes further, “The 
spectrum of conflict in which US forces may be employed spans the full range of military 
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operations. Most of these operations will include multinational partners and nearly all 
will be conducted in a joint environment and include inter-agency coordination. Our goal 
must be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage 
aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, our friends, and 
our interests.”141  To accomplish this goal, the draft plan asserts, “Everyone required to 
conduct military operations will be trained, under realistic conditions and to exacting 
standards, prior to execution of those operations. People selected for joint assignments 
will be trained prior to reaching their duty location.”142 
So the stage would seem to be set with direction provided by the Secretary of 
Defense and policy guidance issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the 
service components to move out and execute their orders in a coordinated manner. Well, 
not exactly. One of the constraints is that even though the curriculum to be delivered is 
joint, each of the services has retained its own venue for delivering JPME and its own 
personnel assignment mechanisms for selecting and assigning officers to this training. All 
US War Colleges, selected foreign war colleges, and selected fellowship programs award 
completion of JPME Phase I in conjunction with their in-residence programs as does the 
Naval Post-Graduate School.  
A concerted effort has been made to deliver this curriculum via on line distance 
learning programs as well. This pedagogical method alleviates to some degree, the 
problems associated with officers needing to carve out of their service specific training 
and operations regimens the time to devote to an in residence program. Of course, the 
time has to come from somewhere, generally from the officers’ personal schedules and 
after-hours or off-duty time. JPME Phase II opportunities are even fewer and the 
providers limited to a handful of outlets – principally the National War College and the 
Joint Forces Staff College. Curriculum development, refinement and expansion in the 
area of inter-agency competencies appear to be lagging at each venue.   
In conjunction with the FY 2005 Defense authorization Act, the House of 
Representatives attempted to incorporate language requiring the standardization of the 
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JPME curriculum across the providing venues. “The House version of the authorization 
bill would [have] established a chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code consolidating laws 
affecting joint professional military education. It also would [have] prescribed 16 subject 
areas that must be covered as part of training for officers in the armed services, to include 
national military strategy, strategic planning and joint and combined operations, 
integrated employment of land, sea and air forces; contingency planning; joint logistics; 
command and control of combat operations; joint intelligence; joint requirements 
development; and military history. House lawmakers also wanted future leaders to have 
greater awareness of cultures in countries where U.S. forces may deploy.”143 The 
measure, hotly contested by DOD, was not incorporated in the final bill.  
Missing from even the most recent JPME guidance is any suggestion of the 
disruptive type of innovation that would seem to be required to refocus DOD on 
combating non-traditional foes in collaboration with its inter-agency partners. The 
Chairman of the Joint Staff’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy represents 
valuable but evolutionary change along a continuum; not a radical rethinking of 
education and training requirements demanded by a new threat and response 
environment. As an example, the involvement of civilian students is generally permitted 
rather than directed. The instruction states: “The Services and [National Defense 
University] may include civilian students in their programs. Civilian students should have 
appropriate academic and professional backgrounds. Participation by both DOD and non-
DOD civilian students is desired, with focus of non-DOD students on perspectives of the 
inter-agency.”144 It is not clear that these types of students have been or will be actively 
recruited which would seem to diminish the impact of the otherwise laudatory efforts to 
build the JPME curricula around a seminar style of education that fosters the 
development of long lasting interpersonal relationships as well as the rich exchange of 
diverse professional views. Recognizing the value of this instructional method in 
advancing the agenda of building a joint force  - “Small group learning should be the 
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principal resident education methodology”145 - the concept could be readily expanded to 
the include reduction of cultural barriers among DOD and inter-agency partners by 
altering the mix of DOD and inter-agency civilian students. The involvement of civilian 
students is more extensively contemplated at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 
but one new initiative stands out that genuinely represents a bold and intentional 
approach to bridging the DOD-inter-agency gap. It currently falls outside of the JPME 
constellation but offers a template that could be applied to a JPME setting.   
Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, the Naval Post Graduate School has implemented a distance-learning 
curriculum for DOD and Inter-agency personnel. Students who successfully complete 
this rigorous 18-month program earn a Master of Arts degree in Homeland Security - the 
first of its kind. When operating at capacity, the program is expected to graduate 
approximately 120 students per year. By carefully controlling admissions, the school has 
ensured that the preponderance of students is drawn from the ranks of first responders, 
state and local emergency managers, and non-DOD federal agencies. DOD 
representation, both uniformed and civilian, is generally no more than 10% - 15% of each 
class.  
While sustaining this innovation is critical, moving to the disruptive level of effort 
would involve a radical change in the program’s scope and orientation. The current 
program might become an adjunct to a 9-month in residence curriculum modeled after 
those in place at the nation’s war colleges. The disruptive aspect of such a program would 
be that the student population would be tailored to reflect a DOD/Inter-agency mix of 
approximately 1/3 – 2/3 with a throughput matching that of any of the other senior 
schools. Establishing this new school – the Homeland Defense College - under the 
auspices of Commander, USNORTHCOM, on site at the USNORTHCOM headquarters 
complex, would ensure a steady infusion of national leadership level speakers as well as 
daily access to ongoing HLD/HLS operations. There would be regular opportunities for 
students representing a wide variety of agencies and organizational tiers in the HLD/HLS 
effort to study and work alongside one another, building relationships and breaking down 
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cultural barriers that have impeded collaborative efforts to date. Furthermore, the school 
would offer the Commander a ready source of think tank resources and would serve as a 
forum for discussion and evaluation of emerging HLD/HLS concepts. The Homeland 
Defense College would serve as an on-site Center of Excellence, a full member of the 
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) that is vital to successful prosecution of 
the war on terror.   
Others have proposed similar arrangements. One proposal calls for the 
establishment of a National Homeland Security University sponsored by DHS.146 
Another study, jointly sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) and 
Commander, US Joint Forces Command, promotes the consolidation of inter-agency 
training and education, naturally enough, at NDU.147  The proposed curriculum for this 
program would nominally consist of four courses – JIACG 101, Military 101, IA 101, 
and Command Specific Considerations.148 Additionally, in May of 2005, Representative 
Curt Weldon, R-Pa., the vice chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee and 
member of the Armed Services Committee added language to the fiscal 2006 defense 
authorization bill (HR 1815) to “express the Sense of Congress that the Secretary of 
Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security should establish” the 
National College of Homeland Security at NDU. Funding was not provided.149 The 
director of NDU’s Institute for Homeland Security Studies has recently weighed in on 
this topic as follows: “Stephen M. Duncan, a former assistant secretary of Defense who 
served as drug czar under President George H.W. Bush … [stated] the college’s mission, 
is to ‘create the leaders in homeland security for the future. We’re not talking about 
educating first responders. … There are graduate colleges all over the country that can do 
that.’ Duncan said the college would offer graduate-level degree programs for senior-
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level staff at DHS and related agencies. Courses would also be open to state and local 
emergency management officials and corporate vice presidents. Unlike nine-month NDU 
programs geared to military officers, Duncan said the homeland curriculum would consist 
of short courses, Web-based instruction and night and weekend programs.”150 
These proposals while generally meritorious, represent sustaining initiatives in 
that they would essentially graft an inter-agency component onto traditionally formatted 
training programs or would create a stand alone Homeland Security University that might 
attract DHS staff but would appear to be out of DOD’s lane. Excluding first responders 
would be a mistake of the highest order. Absent their active participation, many of the 
opportunities for breaking down cultural barriers between DOD and inter-agency partners 
would be missed. This policy, once it became widely known, would exacerbate the 
mistrust of DOD as a “know it all, when we want your opinion we’ll give it to you,” kind 
of outfit.  
The disruptive aspect of a USNORTHCOM chartered college dedicated to 
providing the highest quality education to DOD and non-DOD personnel in the fields of 
HLD/HLS cannot be minimized. It would represent DOD moving deliberately and 
forcefully “beyond joint” for the specific purpose of mobilizing and leveraging all aspects 
of national power in fulfillment of its mission to Deter, Prevent, and Defeat current and 
potential adversaries by any available means. Establishment of this school would 
represent the combining of familiar elements of national power in new ways that have not 
been previously envisioned or valued.151 By being DOD chartered and sponsored, DOD 
personnel could participate without jeopardizing their standing within their own service 
communities. This is essential to turning the corner on the development of a cadre of 
officers who can move effortlessly in and out of joint, inter-agency, and service specific 
environments.  
Developing a fresh curriculum focused on tested JMETs derived from both the 
DHS Universal Task List (UTL) and the DOD Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and 
emphasizing a case study, practicum based approach to instruction would enable a new 
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Homeland Defense College to break with traditional, DOD-centric stove-piped courses of 
study. It would extend the concept of joint to the next higher or integrated level. One 
particular benefit of this approach would be that perceived deficiencies in the current 
JPME II curriculum could be addressed. In a December 2002 report, the GAO noted, 
“About 24 percent of the officers who had completed the second phase [of JPME] 
responded that attending the second phase was important to a little or no extent. In focus 
group discussions, these officers said that the program is too long, redundant with the 
first phase of joint education, and of little added value.”152 Only “Eleven per cent 
responded that attending the second phase was important to a very great extent.”153 This 
is a sobering commentary with ramifications for the Chairman’s policy that contemplates 
introducing substantive inter-agency content at the JPME II level.154 
A Homeland Defense College might adopt a different approach. Rather than 
merely adding additional inter-agency content to the existing JPME Phase II Learning 
Areas, this curriculum should be overhauled from top to bottom with special 
consideration given to the unique inter-agency/DOD composition of the student body. 
DOD wide, modifying the entire JPME concept by reworking Phase II entirely, would 
represent a form of disruptive innovation and would produce a more logical and more 
highly valued career progression for military officers.  
To overcome service component resistance by invoking a form of disguise,155 
JPME Phase I would remain essentially unchanged (though the inter-agency themes cited 
in JPME Standard I would be introduced) and would follow initial tours of duty and the 
completion of essential service specific professional qualifications. JPME Phase II, rather 
than replicating Phase I, would expand the officer’s portfolio of essential skills through 
immersion level exposure to inter-agency concepts and interaction with inter-agency 
counterparts. At this career juncture, student participants from both the DOD and inter-
agency worlds would have established themselves as valued “players” in their respective 
agencies and organizations. The resultant classroom and seminar interaction would 
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consequently be more frank and of greater scope and depth. The goal of fostering more 
effective working relationships between DOD and non-DOD leaders would be achieved 
through the establishment of informal inter-personal networks forged in study groups and 
through the completion of assigned projects. JPME Phase II would be conducted at the 
graduate level of study. By eliminating redundancies and by interjecting a robust 
opportunity for interaction with “rising stars” from the inter-agency world, the entire 
endeavor might even be greeted with greater enthusiasm by the sending services.  
It would seem, at least, to go a long way toward achieving the transformation 
objectives established by Secretary Rumsfeld. It would also help to realize the 
Secretary’s vision of a force equipped and genuinely committed to “transforming the way 
the Department integrates military power with other instruments of national power [that] 
will help ensure that when we employ military power, we do so in the most effective way 
possible. Integration of national power is especially critical for overcoming terrorists or 
other unconventional adversaries that cannot be defeated by military means alone. 
Enhanced coordination among agencies and across all levels of government (federal, state 
and local) will promote increased cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to 
conduct seamless operations.”156 
JPME has proven to be a vital cornerstone in reshaping the US military force. Originally 
envisioned by President Eisenhower in the years following World War II,157 it has 
provided a common intellectual basis for the planning and conduct of operations that are 
truly joint. More importantly it has provided an opportunity for officers to overcome 
service-specific cultural obstacles by exchanging views and interacting with one another 
in an academic environment where lives are not on the line. In short, it has prepared them 
for effective service with one another in the joint arena. This success story needs to be 
replicated and expanded to include active engagement with personnel slated for positions 
of increasing responsibility with their non-DOD organizations. Ronald R. Krebs, in his 
thoughtful piece “A School for the Nation” observes that inter-personal contact in a 
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military setting alone is insufficient for fostering cultural assimilation.158 However, 
inviting similarly motivated students from different agencies and differing response tiers 
to study together in a specialized Homeland Defense College as a pre-cursor to serving 
together in the field would seem a perfect method for enhancing the effectiveness of all 
parties in better fulfilling their HLD/HLS responsibilities. The scope of the educational 
requirements for military officers specified in Title 10, USC, chapter 38, section 663 
should be expanded to include an inter-agency component. Doing so would open the door 
to better preparing military officers for effective service in an inter-agency environment. 
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VIII. ASSIGNMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Completion of the academic portion of JPME is a necessary but insufficient 
element of an officer’s joint professional development. In addition to fulfilling specified 
curriculum requirements, officers must complete a tour of duty with a joint command in 
order to qualify for designation as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). As reported by the 
GAO, this is a demanding obligation that not all officers believe to be helpful in 
advancing their careers (underscore added):  
Overall, officers told us that they viewed their assignment to a joint 
position as a positive experience and that their services also saw joint 
assignments as valuable career moves. Moreover, 51 percent of the 
officers surveyed responded that an assignment to a joint position is a 
defined aspect of their career path. … However, many officers also told us 
that they were reluctant to seek the joint specialty designation. Their 
concern was that they would be flagged as joint specialty officers and, 
accordingly, be reassigned to subsequent tours of duty within joint 
organizations. They were concerned about the need to balance the 
requirements of already crowded service career paths and the expectation 
to serve in joint organizations. Their ultimate concern was that multiple 
joint assignments would take them away from service assignments for too 
great a period and that this time away could adversely affect their career 
progression and promotion potential. The officers responded that the joint 
specialty officer designation was not really important for the rank and 
file—but really only important for those who were going to be admirals 
and generals. In other words, these officers believed that the need to meet 
service expectations seemed to override any advantages that the joint 
specialty officer designation might provide.159 
Pierce observes that senior military leaders modulate the pace and duration of 
innovation through the control of promotion policies.160 This powerful mechanism has 
the overall impact of dramatically curtailing the introduction of ideas that stray very far 
from accepted norms, and acts as a real brake on those who would venture far from their 
service fold. It was exactly this phenomenon that precipitated Title IV of Goldwater-
Nichols. Absent the legislative mandate requiring service in the joint arena as a pre-
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condition for promotion to the flag and general officer ranks, the services could still 
maintain an absolute lock on the hearts and minds of officers who were wholly dependent 
on maintaining the good will of their seniors in fulfilling their service specific duties and 
responsibilities. Goldwater-Nichols of course did little to break the absolute power of the 
promotion boards in determining who would be deemed “best qualified” to carry forward 
the mantle of the various services as the next generation of senior leadership. The Act did 
preclude the adverse non-consideration of candidates who had ventured into the purple 
world. 
In a post-joint environment, the next disruptive innovation in the assignment and 
promotion of officers would be to extend the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols to 
specifically authorize the awarding of joint tour credit for the completion of service with 
inter-agency components. Among these, for example, would be the National Guard, 
DHS, US Coast Guard, TSA, FAA, FEMA, FBI, Treasury and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). This would require the identification of appropriate billets beyond 
the liaison officer role at each of these agencies and an expansion of the Joint Duty 
Assignment List (JDAL). The services would continue to screen officers for assignment 
out of their service lanes as is currently done for joint assignments. The services would 
also monitor career progression and the timetables under which an officer must fulfill the 
requirements for appointment to a command billet.  
The disruptive aspect of this proposal would be that an officer might be posted to 
USCG or to the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) as opposed to a joint 
command or organization such as USPACOM, or the Joint Staff and still receive credit 
for having served in a meaningful position outside of his or her own service. This is the 
essence of the new joint – tartan rather than purple. But the point would be the same – to 
broaden that officer’s professional perspective, to break down cultural barriers on a 
reciprocal basis, to foster the development of common plans for countering the enemy, 
and to conduct consistently successful HLD/HLS missions. It would mean aligning the 
total DOD/inter-agency force for the purpose of countering emerging threats in a manner 
not previously contemplated. This assignment would not be in addition to the 
requirement for completion of a joint service tour of duty. It would be in lieu of – on an 
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equivalent quality of assignment basis. There is a precedent for this type of assignment in 
that the law currently authorizes the Secretary of Defense to award joint credit to officers 
serving in “defense agencies and….certain joint force headquarters staffs.”161  
Modifying the assignment process requires the identification and establishment of 
billets in which military officers might serve in a meaningful manner with non-DOD 
agencies. Instead of the Joint Service Billets prescribed by the JDAL, these inter-agency 
jobs could be designated as joint-equivalent Integrated Service Billets. The first of these 
billets might best be instituted in the Intelligence, Operations, Planning, and 
Communications sections of the receiving agencies – the DOD equivalent of J2, J3, J5 
and J6. These are the staff sections where the duties performed most closely parallel 
those common to the uniformed services and where the officers assigned would be most 
likely to add the greatest value.  
Additionally, the assignment of DOD personnel to these types of roles would 
have the greatest chance of overcoming service resistance. It would be an extension of 
the “disguising” function proposed by Pierce.162 No one would be actually fooled of 
course, but the service objections that could be expected to arise might never the less be 
blunted by representing an assignment of this nature as remaining in consonance with 
“normal” service career progression. The services are already on the hook to “give up” an 
officer to the purple world for a joint tour. Aligning non-DOD duties with the type of 
responsibilities already evaluated by the services as acceptable when fulfilled at a joint or 
combined command would serve to minimize sending service opposition. 
To accomplish the goal of better integrating DOD and non-DOD personnel, 
however, it would be important for these jobs to be fully operational rather than liaison in 
nature. Liaison officers (LNOs) are typically posted in the manner of ambassadors 
dispatched to a distant land. They wind up in the professionally awkward position of 
attempting to serve two masters – their sending organization and the agency to which 
they have been assigned. Put another way, the principle of a single chain of command is 
effectively violated as LNOs are not fully answerable to the one putting a roof over their 
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head, but rather have allegiances elsewhere. In theory, information will flow 
unencumbered between the organizations but it takes extraordinary levels of 
professionalism for this to occur.  
LNOs serve as valuable conduits for the exchange of information, but they are not 
decision makers. They are typically not empowered to speak officially, absent 
consultation and direct authorization, on behalf of their sending organization. Thus, 
planning efforts are not always expedited by their presence. The principal value added by 
LNOs lies in their contribution to an environment where dialogue can more readily occur. 
They also serve to cut through layers of bureaucracy to find the right action officer at 
their sending service when needed. In an inter-agency environment, LNOs would serve as 
interpreters of DOD culture and would bring to the table perspective and knowledge of 
DOD unique capabilities. While this contribution can be exceedingly valuable, breaking 
down cultural barriers requires that these personnel be perceived by their inter-agency 
counterparts as fully functioning players, not as emissaries.  
Lacking inter-agency specific training, military officers can, however, bring other 
valuable skills to an inter-agency assignment. Specifically, the uniformed officers would 
offer, on arrival, a wealth of experience in planning and conducting complex and multi-
faceted military operations. DHS for instance has yet to develop a planning capability as 
extensive as that found on a routine basis among DOD plans directorates. Adopting a 
common approach to planning has been mentioned as a necessity in USNORTHCOM 
after action reports from a number of National Special Security Events.163  
DOD personnel assigned to non-DOD agencies and organizations would also add 
value through their familiarity with sophisticated communications systems and with 
procedures for interpreting and handling classified intelligence information. The 
receiving agency would be augmented by personnel who arrive with background checks 
complete and security clearances authorized. The capacity of the receiving agency to 
access classified information through secure channels would be immediately enhanced. 
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Additionally, officers assigned to the receiving agency’s communications section 
would provide significant insight into the availability and capability of military 
communications systems. This would increase the likelihood of establishing fully 
interoperable clear and secure communications networks among agencies and 
organizations tasked with conducting a particular HLD/HLS operation. These are the 
types of tasks that enhance not only an agency’s capabilities, but also the officer’s 
professional development in a manner that would be valued by his/her sending service. It 
would be consistent with the types of service currently rendered in the course of a joint 
assignment or perhaps even an exchange assignment as is common among the Navy and 
the USCG.  
Certain assignments would appear to be natural for fitting military officers into 
inter-agency jobs. Fixed-wing flight qualified Air Force, Navy and Marine officers, for 
example, should be able to readily find a home with FAA or TSA. Helicopter pilots from 
the various services would add value on arrival with Customs and Border Patrol teams 
who operate these aircraft in a variety of law enforcement and drug interdiction roles. 
Military police officers, while formally trained in skills not required of their federal law 
enforcement agency counterparts, would be the rational choice for assignment to FBI, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), and possibly Secret Service.  
Of greatest value in facilitating increased cooperation with other than active duty 
DOD elements, however, would be to augment the number of permanent active duty 
military billets embedded with state National Guard organizations. Even though the 
Army and Air National Guard functionality is virtually indistinguishable from that of 
their active duty counterparts, the governing statutory authorities contained in USC Title 
10 and Title 32 are different. Additionally, the battle rhythm driven by the schedules of 
part-time personnel demands a unique approach to the planning and conduct of many 
types of military missions. 
Again, the purpose of these assignments would be to cross-pollinate DOD and 
inter-agency personnel and practices. A desired outcome of this effort would be the 
development of a substantial cadre of officers who are as familiar with the roles, 
missions, and operational practices of partnering organizations as they are those of their 
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own sending service. Having been immersed in these organizations, performing duties 
beyond those of liaison officer or observer, the officers, in theory, would be equipped for 
future service at more senior levels with “bi-lingual” or “multi-cultural” skills and with 
established credentials and a network of valuable professional relationships.   
Upon completion of an inter-agency tour, the officer would receive a skill coding 
similar to the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation. The Navy, citing “the need for 
the development of a cadre of naval officers educated or experienced in the theories, 
principles, processes, and techniques for countering terrorist strategies,”164 has recently 
expanded its list of approved subspecialty codes to include a Homeland Defense and 
Security category.165 Establishing a subspecialty code – as differentiated from a principal 
warfare specialty, e.g. Surface Warfare, Aviation Warfare, Submarine Warfare, is an 
essential pre-cursor to assigning naval officers to HLD/HLS billets. It is this assignment 
following the completion of education and training where the lessons learned in the 
classroom are reinforced and made a permanent part of the officer’s professional skill 
portfolio.  
Designation as a HLD/HLS sub-specialist upon completion of a tour of duty in 
the field would, in the Navy’s case, be concurrent with designation as a Joint or Inter-
agency Service Officer.  For the Navy, this important education, designation, assignment 
link has been strengthened by the Naval Postgraduate School’s efforts at pioneering a 
Master’s level curriculum in Homeland Defense and Security at the behest of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Domestic Preparedness.166  
The other services will need to implement the means of tracking officers who 
have completed HLD/HLS training and assignments in accordance with their own 
personnel and training methods. All of the services will then need to take active measures 
to ensure that officers completing qualifications in this new sub-specialty are protected as 
they compete for promotion. Pierce observes that securing the future of officers who 
                                                 
164 U. S. Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) (N/3/5), letter to 
Commanding Officer, Navy Manpower Analysis Center (Code 10) SER N3N5/756964 of 03 February 
2004, unpublished. 
165 U.S. Navy Manpower Analysis Center Memorandum to Navy Officer Occupational Classification 
System (NOOSC) Executive Committee SER 12/577 of 22 July 2004, unpublished. 
166 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N3/5) letter of 03 February 2004. 
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endeavor to break trail for new approaches to doing DOD business – as in fostering real 
collaboration among DOD and its inter-agency partners - is a critical aspect of successful 
disruptive innovation.167  
Absent the affirmative top cover provided by influential senior service leaders, 
those who would first accept and, hopefully, seek tours of duty with inter-agency 
organizations, could be left with few opportunities for meaningful follow-on assignments. 
The services over the years have proven literally ruthless in punishing professionally 
those who would stray far from traditionally accepted career development and 
advancement norms. Pierce cites examples of the US Marine Corps purging officers who 
had dared to become open advocates of General Gray’s maneuver warfare concepts.168 
He also cites examples of the US Navy showing the door to those officers who had 
supported Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Elmo Zumwalt’s, transformational initiatives 
implemented in the post-Viet Nam era.169  
It is unlikely that providing top cover for officers who put their careers on the line 
to further DOD and inter-agency cooperation can be entrusted to the services themselves. 
Crushing or marginalizing innovators, even those acting to advance the nation’s interests, 
is apparently not a uniquely American trait as Pierce notes in citing examples from both 
the Japanese and British militaries.170  Similar cases are undoubtedly to be found among 
almost all other forms of endeavor. The difference is that in commerce, for example, 
innovators who disrupt corporate leadership’s sense of order are often pushed out the 
door only to become fabulously wealthy entrepreneurs. In the closed system of the 
military however, there are few roads to redemption once one has been cast into the outer 
darkness of a job at a steel desk in a remote corner of the service’s empire.  
This unlovely attribute of military culture is why Congressional action is required to 
ensure that closer DOD and inter-agency collaboration is both implemented and 
sustained. Goldwater-Nichols included specific provisions to protect officers assigned to 
joint duty by stipulating that officers designated as Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) must 
                                                 
167 Pierce, 161. 
168 Ibid., 98. 
169 Ibid., 161. 
170 Ibid., 143; 50. 
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be promoted at a pace equivalent to peers who continued to occupy positions with their 
service components.171 Amending Goldwater-Nichols to provide joint duty credit for 
service with partnering agencies will require additional language to ensure that officers 
filling these important assignments are not professionally handicapped (or tacitly 





    
                                                 
171 Title 10 USC, Sections 662, 665. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
DOD is faced with the challenge of transforming itself to confront an adaptive 
trans-national terrorist threat while preserving the skills, capabilities and technological 
advantages it currently enjoys over potential nation-state adversaries. In confronting this 
challenge, DOD must swiftly improve its HLD/HLS capabilities. It must join with its 
inter-agency partners in applying the full spectrum of national power to deter, prevent 
and defeat terrorist attacks. The scope and magnitude of this effort demand genuine 
innovation, not marginal improvement. The effort demands disruptive innovation 
represented by the unprecedented integration of DOD and inter-agency organizations. As 
Pierce and others have demonstrated, however, it should be expected that innovation on 
this scale is likely to be resisted by the military service components.  
Integrating DOD with non-DOD agencies is a task similar to integrating the 
various services in a joint manner. This process, too, was actively and passively resisted 
by the service chiefs. Their recalcitrance was finally overcome with the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The specific provisions of Goldwater-Nichols included 
both incentives and penalties intended to expedite adoption of the organizational reforms 
necessary to transform the separate services into a joint force. The legislation explicitly 
required the implementation of a comprehensive training and education program intended 
to facilitate the reduction of inter-service cultural barriers. 
In the 19 years subsequent to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the military has 
made incremental progress in becoming more joint. Applying the criteria introduced by 
Pierce, however, this progress represents sustaining, evolutionary change along an 
established and expected transformational trajectory.172 The effort to become more joint 
has consisted largely of better integrating existing military components outfitted with 
technologically improved equipment. Today the joint world remains exclusively a 
military construct. Disruptive innovation of the type envisioned by Pierce will occur 
when inter-agency partners are grafted into the military’s family of arms. 
                                                 
172 Pierce, 25; 30. 
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Several actions might expedite the process of enhancing and expediting 
collaboration among DOD and non-DOD agencies. The best opportunities for swiftly 
altering the DOD/inter-agency landscape appear to lie in amending the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, extending its provisions to include the inter-agency sector. Broadening the 
scope of Goldwater-Nichols in this manner would provide the impetus for disruptive 
innovation in the training, education and assignment of military officers, better equipping 
them for effective service in an inter-agency environment.  
Seemingly the most important attribute of a legislative initiative would be to 
provide officers with career protection for venturing into the inter-agency arena. If 
officers could earn what is now known as joint duty credit through service with inter-
agency organizations, they would expand their knowledge and experience base without 
being perceived by their own service as having strayed too far off a “normal” career path. 
Goldwater-Nichols currently stipulates that officers must have purple experience to be 
eligible for promotion to flag or general officer rank. Selection boards controlled by the 
separate services have come to expect, over the past 19 years, that the officers best 
qualified for promotion will have served successfully in a purple assignment. Expanding 
the list of qualifying billets to include inter-agency opportunities, tartan jobs, would 
appear a logical next step. As discussed, Pierce has demonstrated that providing officers 
with career top cover is essential to fostering the type of environment in which disruptive 
innovation can occur.173 A new legislative mandate would serve as this type of shield. 
For these types of assignments to be possible, the services and their inter-agency 
counterparts will need to define and create qualifying inter-agency billets. Again, a 
statutory mandate may well be required to start the services down this path. There are 
currently many impediments to be overcome, not the least of which are budgetary 
obstacles. As an example, as recently as 27 July, 2005, SECDEF’s Executive Secretary 
addressed a memorandum to the Secretaries of the various military departments, to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to their deputies stating: “As a general policy, 
only details [assignments] outside of the Department [of Defense] on a reimbursable 
basis will be approved. Exceptions to this policy will be made only in the most 
                                                 
173 Pierce, 162. 
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compelling circumstances when the department, component or agency head has certified 
that the net benefit of the detail accrues to the Department of Defense.”174 This 
memorandum would suggest that there is a more than a little way to go in viewing day to 
day DOD involvement with inter-agency organizations as the usual and customary way 
of “providing for the common defense.”175  
Getting to a point where fully integrated DOD/inter-agency operations are 
perceived as the norm will require a significant revamping of the DOD training and 
education pipeline. Merely assigning officers to inter-agency billets, expecting them to 
report for duty, sit down alongside their non-DOD counterparts and commence 
operations different from what they have experienced in their ships, squadrons and 
battalions is not a plan for success. Again, expanding the scope of Goldwater-Nichols 
would seem to offer a plausible way ahead as this act already addresses important aspects 
of training and education.  Goldwater-Nichols might be amended to prescribe that the 
current JPME curricula be expanded to incorporate substantive inter-agency content. This 
content, in turn, would be derived from integrating DOD/inter-agency specific tasks 
currently reflected in the DOD UJTL, and the DHS UTL and TCL. In the course of 
exhaustively examining and combining the existing elements of these task lists, new, 
hybrid tasks might also be identified.   
USNORTHCOM has commenced the process of developing for Joint Staff 
approval, a JMETL that incorporates HLD and HLS specific tasks. The importance of 
these tasks has been validated by members of SJFHQ-N who have participated with their 
inter-agency counterparts in support of multiple NSSEs. Fully realizing and leveraging 
the operational capabilities of non-DOD partners requires that non-DOD tasks, as 
reflected in the DHS UTL and TCL be woven into the fabric of the proposed 
USNORTHCOM JMETL. SJFHQ-N represents a form of small innovation group that 
Pierce has demonstrated is essential to fostering disruptive innovation.176 Commander, 
USNORTHCOM might exploit this organization in its frequent deployments to further 
                                                 
174 William P. Marriott, Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, Memorandum to 
Secretaries of the Military Departments, OSD 14470-05 of 27 July 2005, unpublished. 
175 U.S. Constitution, preamble. 
176 Pierce, 30. 
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test and evaluate new DOD/inter-agency concepts of the type that was represented by 
appointing a National Guard JTF commander to command both National Guard and 
active duty forces in support of National Special Security Events (NSSEs).  
The benefit of DOD and inter-agency personnel serving together in an operational 
setting was also demonstrated at the NSSEs. These missions provided opportunities for 
DOD and non-DOD personnel to become better acquainted with one another’s 
terminology, operational doctrine and style, and organizational culture. It is not difficult 
to imagine how the assimilation and integration process might be enhanced if a robust 
cadre of DOD and inter-agency personnel could study together prior to reporting for duty 
at their respective organizations. Expanding the JPME curriculum to include significant 
inter-agency content and offering the program to both DOD and non-DOD personnel at a 
newly created Homeland Defense College sponsored and administered by 
USNORTHCOM would represent a breakthrough in conceptualizing a wholly new 
approach to the nation’s defense.  
The limited numbers of personnel studying together in the master’s degree level 
program currently being pioneered at the Naval Post Graduate School will not produce 
the critical mass of men and women needed to transform DOD and inter-agency 
organizations. Expanding such programs on a USNORTHCOM sponsored Homeland 
Defense College campus would offer the additional benefit of providing the 
USNORTHCOM Commander with a readily accessible “lab” and think-tank to explore 
new HLD/HLS concepts. With a curriculum extending well beyond that associated with 
certificate programs, this college might also serve to identify promising candidates for 
additional study and service in DOD and inter-agency venues at the PhD level.    
Pierce has persuasively demonstrated that disruptive innovation is most likely to 
occur when it is disguised. Disguising the elements of innovation and transformation 
associated with seamlessly integrating DOD and non-DOD personnel in the performance 
of new HLD/HLS missions may take several forms. First, to overcome service resistance, 
this integration process will probably have to be civilian directed in the form of an 
amendment to Goldwater-Nichols, expanding the concept of joint to inter-agency, purple 
to tartan. This would not be a disguise per se but an inescapable imperative that senior 
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leadership could invoke while implementing aspects of DOD/inter-agency change. Flag 
and general officers need career top cover too. A broadened statute would provide these 
officers with the means for conveying the message “Get in step, people. We’ve got to do 
this.” 
Another form of disguise might be employed by designating the first DOD 
personnel to occupy inter-agency billets as Liaison Officers. As discussed, this 
arrangement would be sub-optimal in terms of immediate operational effectiveness, but 
might lead to greater acceptance by avoiding the appearance of DOD personnel making 
decisions that were “out of their lane” or “above their pay grade.” In the training and 
education realm, a disguise might be crafted by taking the interim step of sponsoring a 
rigorous but part-time Homeland Defense course of study leading to a degree at a college 
or university in the vicinity of USNORTHCOM. Breaking ground on a new bricks and 
mortar institution could occur later.  
Finally, USNORTHCOM might establish an Experimentation and Transformation 
Directorate (J9). In conjunction with the Training and Education Directorate (J7), J9 
could explore transformational training, education and assignment initiatives in an 
experimental capacity that is not perceived as an immediate threat to the other staff 
directorates. As mentioned earlier, SJFHQ-N might serve as an operational test bed for 
these proposed initiatives. 
This thesis has examined certain aspects of DOD transformation associated with 
new HLD/HLS missions. Areas for additional research include devising the Measures of 
Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) needed to evaluate the impact 
of the proposed changes in the training, education and assignment of military officers if 
these changes were to be implemented. As frequently cited, the GAO has provided 
periodic assessments to the Congress on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols in making the 
services more joint or purple. Similar studies will need to be undertaken to determine if 
the services and their interagency counterparts have effectively become more tartan.   
Transforming DOD in a manner that embraces full partnership with non-DOD 
agencies in conducting HLD/HLS missions is a vital but daunting undertaking. 
Persuading the component services to wholeheartedly initiate the type of transformational 
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measures called for in SECDEF guidance and demanded by a radically altered strategic 
environment is essential to advancing the nation’s security interests. It is arguably more 
than a little unlikely that this will occur, however, without external impetus. Pierce has, in 
a comprehensive manner, shown that Presidents and service chiefs have been thwarted 
over the years in imposing their transformational views on military senior leaders.177 As 
Pierce notes, the types of changes required on a disruptive scale to effectively accomplish 
new HLD/HLS missions must be introduced and managed differently than the sustaining 
types of evolutionary military change that service chiefs expect and prefer.178 
Altering the statutory context as was done to finally propel the services in the 
direction of joint planning and operations appears to offer the best hope for timely 
adoption and execution of the policies needed to bring about full DOD and inter-agency 
engagement. Amending Goldwater-Nichols to specifically address DOD/inter-agency 
involvement across the spectrum of the training, education and assignment of military 
officers would provide a valuable and necessary framework in which disruptive 
innovators could continue to operate.  
The 9/11 Commission, in the section of its report entitled “Reflecting on a Generational 
Challenge,” notes that as of the summer of 2004, “three years after 9/11, Americans are 
still thinking and talking about how to protect our nation in this new era.”179 It is 
incumbent on all of those serving in DOD/inter-agency roles to take the measures 
necessary to ensure that the challenge posed by the Commission may be interpreted as 
pertaining to a generation and not for a generation. We will have failed if these three 
years become another thirty.  
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179 9/11 Commission Report, 361. 
 87
APPENDIX  
A.  SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
Survey forms were distributed to 25 military and civilian personnel assigned to 
USNORTHCOM’S Standing Joint Force Headquarters – North (SJFHQ-N), each of 
whom had participated in one or more of operational deployments in support of National 
Special Security Events (NSSE). Of these, two had participated in all four NSSEs, three 
more had participated in three events, and five personnel had participated in at least two. 
Thus, the survey population comprised a group with broadly based, current and relevant 
experience in serving shoulder to shoulder alongside of their interagency counterparts. 
Strategic National Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) were selected to form the basis of 
the survey as they most closely represent the scope of the content that would need to be 
incorporated in Joint professional Military Education (JPME) curricula and mastered by 
officers assigned to billets in an inter-agency environment. The goal, as well, was to keep 
the survey oriented toward concepts rather than chores. Even though the survey 
participants were functioning at an operational level, they were representing the on-scene 
presence of the USNORTHCOM Commander whose focus is strategic. By extension, the 
USNORTHCOM strategic perspective serves to mirror the broadest view of all DOD 
responsibilities in the HLD/HLS arena.   
The survey was also designed to elicit participant views as to the importance of 
inter-agency specific training, the amount provided via alternative training and education 
methods prior to deployment, and the general value of inter-agency involvement to the 
member’s sending service or organization. Finally, the survey sought to obtain insight 
into the types of vital skills and capabilities, needed by DOD personnel, but not addressed 
by the existing compilation of Strategic National Tasks. 
Of the 25 surveys distributed, fourteen were returned, thirteen of which were 
useable. The fourteenth was sufficiently incomplete – questions left unanswered in a 
sporadic manner – as to distort or complicate the interpretation of the other data. Those 
responding represented a good cross-section of civil service and military ranks and 
service affiliations.  
 88
None of the NSSEs was represented by fewer than four respondents. That is, 
among the respondents four had participated in the G-8 summit, four in the DNC, six in 
the RNC, and eleven in the 2005 Inauguration. Among the original fourteen respondents, 
two had participated in all four events, two had participated in three events, three in two 
events, and seven in a single event. The unused survey was provided by one of the seven 
participants in a single event. 
 
B.  SURVEY RESULTS 
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